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BEN
HHWF Pre-Filed Reply Testimony
Greg Wendt
EXH 2004_R

BEFORE THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
ENERGY FACILITY SITE EVALUATION COUNCIL

In the Matter of the Application of:

Scout Clean Energy, LLC, for Horse Heaven
Wind Farm, LLC, Applicant

DOCKET NO. EF-210011

REPLY TESTIMONY OF
GREG WENDT

Please state your full name and job title.

My name is Greg Wendt and I am Director of Community Development for Benton County. I have worked in county government as a fulltime professional land use planner for the past 26 years in Maryland, Oregon, and Washington. I have worked for Benton County for the past six and a half years. I attended Eastern Washington University and graduated with a degree in urban and regional planning. I also attended Washington State University and received a masters in regional planning.

Have you reviewed the rebuttal testimony prepared by Scout Clean Energy in support of its Application for Site Certification for the Horse Heaven Wind Farm?

Yes. I would like to respond in particular to the testimony of Leslie McClain and Christopher Wiley.

Are you familiar with the Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council's Order No. 883 in this matter?

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4 Yes.

5 **Please describe your understanding of Council Order No. 883.**

6 My understanding of Council Order No. 883 is that the Energy Facility Site
7 Evaluation Council (“EFSEC”) found that, based upon the Benton County Code (“BCC”) in
8 effect at the time of Scout Clean Energy’s (“Scout”) Application for Site Certification
9 (“ASC”), wind farms were allowed as a conditional use in the Growth Management Act
10 Agricultural District (“GMAAD”). However, “[t]he Council’s land use consistency
11 determination does not prejudge whether the Facility has met or can meet Benton County’s
12 conditional use criteria.” Council Order No. 883, ¶ 23.

14 In summary, my understanding of Council Order No. 883 is that it found the Horse
15 Heaven Wind Farm (“HHWF”) was “consistent with land use regulations” in the sense that
16 the HHWF *may* be allowed as a conditional use, not in the sense that it actually satisfies the
17 conditional use permit (“CUP”) criteria. It is my understanding that whether the HHWF will
18 satisfy CUP criteria will be addressed during the adjudication. One of the disputed issues
19 identified in the Second Pre-Hearing Conference Order is BCC 11.50.040(d)—Conditional
20 Use Criteria. The required CUP criteria are as follows:

- 22 (1) Is compatible with other uses in the surrounding area or is no
23 more incompatible than are any other outright permitted uses in
24 the applicable zoning district;
- 25 (2) Will not materially endanger the health, safety, and welfare of
26 the surrounding community to an extent greater than that
27 associated with any other permitted uses in the applicable zoning
28 district;
- 29 (3) Will not cause the pedestrian and vehicular traffic associated
30 with the use to conflict with existing and anticipated traffic in the

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3 neighborhood to an extent greater than that associated with any
4 other permitted uses in the applicable zoning district;

5 (4) Will be supported by adequate service facilities and would not
6 adversely affect public services to the surrounding area; and

7 (5) Would not hinder or discourage the development of permitted
8 uses on neighboring properties in the applicable zoning district as
9 a result of the location, size or height of the buildings, structures,
walls, or required fences or screen vegetation to a greater extent
than other permitted uses in the applicable zoning district.

10 BCC 11.50.040(d).

11 **Do you disagree with the finding of “land use consistency” in Council Order No. 883?**

12 EFSEC was correct that at the time of Scout’s ASC, wind farms were allowed as a
13 conditional use in the GMAAD. However, as I explain in more detail below, a proposed use
14 being potentially allowed as a conditional use in a zoning district is not the same as the
15 proposed use actually meeting the criteria for a CUP. This is why one of the disputed issues
16 is whether the HHWF complies with Benton County’s CUP criteria.
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18 **Do you agree with Ms. McClain’s understanding of the conditional use permit process?**

19 This is actually my main critique of Ms. McCain’s testimony as it is clear that she
20 does not understand how a CUP is processed. Ms. McCain believes that the “County’s role
21 [is] to provide the Council recommendations for conditions to place on the Project which
22 address the County’s conditional use criteria.” McClain Rebuttal Testimony, p. 6. This
23 testimony seems to suggest that because wind farms are allowed as conditional use in the
24 GMAAD, Scout is automatically entitled to a CUP and the only discussion to be had is over
25 applicable conditions. Not only is that not how the CUP process works, it is at odds with
26 Council Order No. 883 which specifically states that EFSEC has not yet “prejudge[d]
27 whether the Facility has met or can meet Benton County’s conditional use criteria.” Ms.
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3 McClain’s understanding is also at odds with the issues for adjudication, which includes
4 BCC 11.50.040(d).

5 It is important for EFSEC and Scout to understand that a conditional use is not the
6 same as a permitted use. Permitted uses are just that—uses that are outright permitted in a
7 zone and that may not even require a permit application to Benton County. Conditional uses,
8 on the other hand, are uses that may be allowed in a zone if they can meet the County’s CUP
9 criteria. The CUP permit application process allows the hearing examiner to evaluate
10 whether a proposed development protects the integrity and purpose of the underlying zoning
11 district, including ensuring compatibility with outright permitted uses. The fact that a use is
12 listed in the BCC as a conditional use is not sufficient for approval of a project. I want to be
13 very clear that applications for a conditional use permit may be lawfully denied or conditions
14 may be imposed that an applicant is unable or unwilling to fulfill. I have been involved with
15 hundreds of CUP applications over my 26-year career and I estimate that I have
16 recommended denial of approximately 10 to 15 CUPs because they did not satisfy applicable
17 criteria. This is because I do not like accepting CUP applications as “complete” that do not
18 and will not meet the CUP criteria. Still, uses must be evaluated on a proposal-by-proposal
19 basis. Based upon the characteristics of an individual proposal, there may be projects that
20 propose a use authorized as a conditional use, but the proposal itself is not consistent with the
21 CUP criteria and cannot be allowed with any conditions.
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25 **How does the conditional use permit process work?**

26 As with any permit process, the CUP process starts with an application by a project
27 proponent describing the proposal. The County would look at the use proposed and
28 determine whether it was authorized in the zoning district in which the property is located. If
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3 the proposal is for a use that is conditionally allowed, the County would begin the CUP
4 process. This process would include evaluating the project as a whole, which includes the
5 application and comments received on the application, to see if it meets the CUP criteria. If
6 the County found that the project as proposed, or as conditioned, could satisfy the CUP
7 criteria, it would recommend approval to the hearing examiner, the decision-making body for
8 the County on CUPs. On the other hand, if the County found that the specific project as
9 proposed, even with conditions, could not satisfy the CUP criteria, it would recommend
10 denial to the hearing examiner. The fact that a use may be allowed subject to a CUP does not
11 automatically entitle a project to a CUP. It is not the County's obligation to identify or
12 invent a full complement of conditions such that any application is essentially assured of
13 approval. Instead, the project proponent must show that the proposed use meets the criteria
14 set forth in BCC 11.50.040(d), which are the same criteria that were in effect at the time of
15 Scout's ASC application.
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18 Taking the HHWF as an example, under the BCC in effect at the time of the
19 application, wind turbine farms were an allowed conditional use in the GMAAD. Under
20 BCC 11.03.010(191), a wind turbine farm "means two or more wind turbines on one parcel."
21 From the base definition of a wind turbine farm, it should be obvious that any number of
22 proposals could be submitted to the County for a "wind turbine farm." In this case, Scout
23 proposes a project boundary of 72,428 acres, with 244 wind turbines to be constructed across
24 an 11,850-acre micrositing corridor.
25

26 I will not repeat my earlier pre-filed testimony that goes into detail over how the
27 HHWF is not compatible with outright permitted uses in the GMAAD and does not satisfy
28 the CUP criteria; however, at a base level, I hope that my testimony has demonstrated that a
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3 proposal for 244 wind turbines is significantly different than a proposal for two wind
4 turbines. Therefore, while a wind turbine farm (aka, more than two wind turbines) is allowed
5 as a conditional use in the GMAAD, it is my professional opinion that the specific HHWF
6 does not satisfy the CUP criteria and therefore should not be granted a CUP.
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8 Ms. McClain is correct that I did not suggest any conditions to EFSEC for the
9 HHWF. She is incorrect in suggesting that my testimony was that the HHWF is not *eligible*
10 for a CUP, regardless of conditions. I acknowledge that the HHWF is eligible for a CUP.
11 However, she is correct that my professional opinion is that there is no set of conditions that
12 would allow the HHWF to meet the conditional use criteria found at BCC 11.50.040. As I
13 stated in my pre-filed testimony, and ignored by Ms. McClain, if all necessary reasonable
14 conditions are not accepted by the applicant so as to allow the decision maker to make the
15 conclusions required by BCC 11.50.040, *the conditional use application shall be denied.*
16

17 **Do you have other critiques of Ms. McClain's testimony?**

18 Outside of my other critiques of Ms. McClain's testimony mentioned above, her
19 resume indicates that she has never worked for a government agency. This means that while
20 she is well respected and has experience with land use permit applications in an advocacy
21 role, she has not listed or identified experiences from the perspective of assessing a project in
22 the role of a local government land use planner with the responsibility to objectively
23 administer and implement government plans, policies, and requirements. This includes
24 objectively reviewing project permit applications, such as CUPs.
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26 Project proponents tend to believe that their projects comply with all applicable
27 regulations and meet whatever criteria are necessary for permit approval—they would not
28 apply for a project otherwise. In my role as a governmental land use planner, I am required
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3 to objectively review a project and make a determination based upon all available
4 information as to whether a project complies with applicable regulations.

5 I also take issue with her testimony that the County is somehow estopped from
6 recommending that EFSEC deny the HHWF based on its noncompliance with Benton
7 County's CUP criteria. I acknowledge that the County has previously permitted wind farms
8 in the GMAAD. However, projects must be evaluated on a project-by-project basis. The
9 fact that the County may have granted a wind farm a CUP in the past does not automatically
10 entitle the HHWF to a CUP. Ms. McClain mentions that Benton County previously
11 permitted the Nine Canyon Wind Farm. That is correct. However, as Ms. McClain notes in
12 her testimony, the Nine Canyon Wind Farm totals 63 wind turbines with a height of 265 feet.
13 Here, Scout proposes either 244 wind turbines with a height of 499 feet or 150 turbines with
14 a height of 657 feet. The original generating capacity for the Nine Canyon Wind Farm was
15 32 megawatts. Scout anticipates the nameplate energy generating capacity for the HHWF to
16 be up to 1,150 MW. The features of the HHWF are significantly different, and in my opinion
17 result in a drastically more intense use, than the Nine Canyon Wind Farm and as such, there
18 is very little use in comparing the two when it comes to conditional uses in the GMAAD.
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22 Nor is the County's previous approval of wind farms a statement that the HHWF
23 complies with the CUP criteria. Instead, as I explained in detail in my pre-filed testimony,
24 based upon the specific proposal that is currently before EFSEC, it is the County's position
25 that the HHWF does not comply with the CUP criteria in BCC 11.50.040(d).

26 **Do you agree with Ms. McClain's testimony that Scout's Application for Site**
27 **Certification shows that the Horse Heaven Wind Farm satisfies the conditional use**
28 **permit criteria?**

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3 No. First, the County has responded to Scout's analysis of the CUP criteria in the
4 ASC—the County does not believe that Scout's analysis was correct and accurate and does
5 not believe that the HHWF meets the County's CUP criteria. I understand that Scout likely
6 does not agree with the County's analysis, but is different than saying the County did not
7 respond constructively. It is Scout that failed to substantively respond to my consideration of
8 the CUP in my pre-filed testimony. Second, I understand that Ms. McClain believes that
9 Section 2.23.2 of the ASC shows that the HHWF complies with Benton County's CUP
10 criteria; however, as noted above, every project applicant believes that their project complies
11 with the applicable criteria and will make statements to this effect. This is why the
12 permitting jurisdiction must look to the project as a whole and evaluate the project
13 independently of what the applicant believes. This includes consideration of all comments
14 received on a project.
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17 I understand that in this case, the "permitting jurisdiction" is EFSEC. Therefore, I
18 also understand that Benton County is in an oppositional, but similar, role to Scout, in that
19 EFSEC will need to evaluate my testimony regarding non-compliance just as it needs to
20 evaluate Scout's statements of compliance. As such, I would direct EFSEC to my pre-filed
21 testimony for a statement of the reasons why Benton County believes the HHWF does not
22 comply with BCC 11.50.040(d). I would also like to point out to EFSEC that Ms. McClain
23 did not address my evaluation of the HHWF's compliance with Benton County's CUP
24 criteria, but instead simply restated what was in the ASC. As I pointed out in my pre-filed
25 testimony, the ASC does not use the correct test of "compatibility" as is defined in BCC
26 11.03.010(53).
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29 **Can you explain the purpose of the Growth Management Act Agricultural District?**

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The purpose of the GMAAD

is to meet the minimum requirements of the State Growth Management Act (Chapter 36.70 RCW) that mandates the designation and protection of agricultural lands of long term commercial significance. The chapter protects the GMA Agricultural District (GMAAD) and the activities therein by limiting non-agricultural uses in the district to those compatible with agriculture and by establishing minimum lot sizes in areas where soils, water, and climate are suitable for agriculture purposes. This chapter is intended to work in conjunction with Chapter 14.05 BCC entitled "Right to Farm" which protects normal agricultural activities from nuisance complaints.

BCC 11.17.010. The conservation of agricultural lands of long-term commercial significance ("ALLTCS") through the GMAAD is not simply a County policy. Instead, it is a state mandate that Benton County must follow. Once Benton County designates land as ALLTCS, it cannot either de-designate ALLTCS or allow non-agricultural uses upon ALLTCS without first making a determination that the lands no longer meet ALLTCS status. Benton County has designated ALLTCS through its GMAAD. If land is zoned GMAAD, it is ALLTCS and cannot be rezoned or put to non-agricultural uses unless the land has been de-designated.

What does it mean for GMAAD land to be de-designated?

Essentially, it means that the land is no longer considered ALLTCS. Once land is no longer considered ALLTCS, Benton County no longer has a GMA obligation to protect and conserve the land and can allow the land to be put to non-agricultural uses. However, until GMAAD land is de-designated, Benton County has a mandate to protect ALLTCS.

Therefore, when Ms. McClain mentions the reduction in GMAAD from the County's 2006 Comprehensive Plan to its 2018 Comprehensive Plan, all that means is that Benton County determined that those 95,599 acres no longer met the criteria to be designated as ALLTCS.

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3 The fact that the County has de-designated ALLTCS is irrelevant to this case as the HHWF is
4 proposed on land that is still designated as ALLTCS. Additionally, reduction in available
5 GMAAD land is not the same as improper conversion of ALLTCS. Reduction in available
6 GMAAD land means that the County has concluded that the land no longer qualifies as
7 ALLTCS. Improper conversion of ALLTCS means that a non-agricultural use is taking
8 place on land that still qualifies as ALLTCS. The County has a state mandate to prevent the
9 latter, not the former.
10

11 **Can you explain the County's concern with the location of the HHWF?**

12 The County's issue with the HHWF's location in the GMAAD is more subtle than
13 Ms. McClain suggests. While yes, the County is concerned about the HHWF's impact on
14 land available for farming, it is also concerned about the incompatibility of the HHWF with
15 the GMAAD regardless of the quantitative impact on land available for farming. As I stated
16 above, the County has an obligation to protect and conserve ALLTCS. The County has done
17 so through implementation of the GMAAD zoning designation. The GMAAD requires
18 limiting non-agricultural uses in the district to those compatible with agriculture. The
19 HHWF is *not* an agricultural use. Based upon the particular characteristics of the HHWF, it
20 is my professional opinion that the HHWF is not compatible with agriculture and cannot
21 meet CUP criteria with our without conditions. Additionally, the HHWF will result in the
22 conversion of ALLTCS in the areas where the solar components and wind turbines are
23 installed. As a planner for the County, I am familiar with the case law surrounding the
24 conversion of ALLTCS due to the potential consequences to the County for any improper de-
25 designation of ALLTCS. Therefore, I am familiar with *King Cnty. v. Cent. Puget Sound*
26 *Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.*, 142 Wn.2d 543 (2008), also commonly referred to as the
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3 “*Soccer Fields*” case, in which the Washington State Supreme Court found the argument that
4 land *could* be returned to agricultural use unpersuasive so as to find that zoning complied
5 with GMA requirements in regard to protection of ALLTCS. My main point here is not
6 necessarily the violation of the GMA that this represents, but also the inconsistency with the
7 BCC’s criteria for CUP analysis.
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9 Having reviewed the ASC and DEIS, that is essentially Scout’s argument—there is a
10 decommissioning plan to revert the land back to agricultural uses once the life of the project
11 is complete and, as such, no ALLTCS is converted. The Supreme Court has already rejected
12 this argument. Therefore, anywhere the HHWF installs long-term supportive wind and solar
13 facility infrastructure, Scout is converting ALLTCS contrary to state and local law
14

15 Contrary to Ms. McClain’s testimony, the County is not concerned about sprawling
16 residential developments in the GMAAD because those developments are not allowed absent
17 a zoning change. My pre-filed testimony detailed the *permitted* uses within the GMAAD,
18 none of which are residential developments. If there was a zoning change, the land would
19 possibly no longer qualify as ALLTCS and the County might not have to limit the non-
20 agricultural uses.
21

22 **What are the consequences if the County does not properly de-designate GMAAD?**

23 The most likely consequence if the County does not properly de-designate land in the
24 GMAAD is that the County will be in violation of the GMA and vulnerable to an appeal
25 before the Growth Management Hearings Board (“GMHB”). This is not a speculative
26 consequence either, as it is my understanding that Franklin County’s most recent
27 comprehensive plan was appealed to the GMHB based upon an alleged improper de-
28 designation of GMAAD. Additionally, while not dealing with the de-designation of
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3 GMAAD, Benton County's 2018 comprehensive plan update was appealed to the GMHB for
4 an alleged non-compliance with the GMA.

5 Once appealed, the GMHB will determine if the County properly de-designated
6 GMAAD. If the GMHB finds that the County did not properly de-designate GMAAD, it will
7 issue either an order of invalidity or non-compliance and Benton County will likely have to
8 rescind its de-designation. Therefore, the fact that no one appealed the County's designation
9 of ALLTCS in 2018 inherently means those lands no longer qualified as ALLTCS and could
10 be put to non-agricultural uses. The County has not attempted to de-designate the lands on
11 which the HHWF is proposed because the County believes those lands still meet the criteria
12 for ALLTCS found in WAC 365-190-050. Regardless of whether an appeal is threatened or
13 likely in the present case, the County intends to follow the law.
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16 **Do you have any response to Mr. Wiley's testimony?**

17 First, I think it's important to point out that neither Mr. Wiley nor Bubba Wiley
18 Wheat, LLC, are listed as landowners within the project lease boundary in Appendix F.
19 Instead, I see a Jason Wiley and Wiley Ranches, Inc., listed as a participating landowner. I
20 assume that Mr. Wiley helps with Wiley Ranches, Inc.; however, I do think it is important to
21 point out to EFSEC that Scout has yet to be able to produce an actual participating landowner
22 to testify as to the alleged beneficial impacts of the HHWF.
23

24 Second, I respect Mr. Wiley's testimony that the HHWF will be beneficial for him
25 and his family. The County has never disputed that the HHWF may be beneficial for those
26 specific farmers that enter into a lease agreement with Scout. Instead, the County is
27 concerned for the agricultural industry as a whole within Benton County, including the
28 agricultural support economy and those farmers who have not entered into a lease agreement
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with Scout. I think Ms. Cooke’s pre-filed testimony does a good job of describing the County’s tangible concerns in this regard. While Mr. Wiley testifies to his belief that the HHWF will be beneficial to seemingly all farmers, he does not parse out those farmers subject to lease agreements and those that will still feel the impacts of the HHWF but are not subject to lease agreements with Scout.

Mr. Wiley’s testimony is further lacking because it is based on short-term economic self interest, while the County’s position must consider the long-term needs of this agricultural region as a whole. This also includes protecting the land from gradual erosion of agricultural land use patterns primarily by land use actions that will permanently transition this area so that it will practically never be farmed again.

I, GREG WENDT, declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing REPLY TESTIMONY OF GREG WENDT is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

DATED this 11 day of July, 2023, at Kennewick, Washington.

 
Community Development Department Director

GREG WENDT

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3 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

4 I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that I
5 served, in the manner indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document as
6 follows:
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8 Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council 9 PO Box 43172 Olympia, WA 98504-3172	[] By United States Mail [x] By Email: adjudication@efsec.wa.gov
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Toppenish, WA 98948 <i>Counsel for Yakama Nation</i>	
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DATED THIS 14th day of July, 2023, at Yakima, Washington.


AZIZA FOSTER

REPLY TESIMONY
OF GREG WENDT - 15

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