

Community Task Force Final Report



Police Department Service Review

Submitted to
City Manager
Vancouver, Washington














November 2013

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SIGNATURE PAGE

We, the below signed members of the Police Department Service Review Community Task Force, do hereby endorse this report to the Vancouver City Manager.

CTF Member	Signature
Winston Asai Vice President Chief Financial Officer, Columbia Machine	
Sharif Burdzik Vice President, Riverview Community Bank	
Wilfredo Collins Member, League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC)	
John Deeder Superintendent, Evergreen Public School District	
Betsy Henning CEO and Founder, AHA! Communications Firm	
Mick Hoffman Director of Safety, Security and Athletics, Vancouver Public School District	
Michelle Hurdle-Bradford Social Change Program Manager YWCA of Clark County	
Franklin Johnson Neighborhood Representative, Bennington Neighborhood	
Dan Keteri Vice President of Patient Care Services, PeaceHealth Southwest Medical Center	
Ross Montgomery Neighborhood Representative, Airport Green Neighborhood	
Eric Olmsted President, On Line Support, Inc.	
Lee Rafferty Executive Director, Vancouver's Downtown Association	
Leilani Russell Owner, Leilani Russell & Associates	

CTF Member	Signature
James Senescu Attorney, Private Practice	
Paul Speer Community Member	
Steven Webb Superintendent, Vancouver Public School District	
Bob Williamson Vice President of Administrative Services, Clark College	

COMMUNITY TASK FORCE: POLICE DEPARTMENT SERVICE REVIEW
REPORT TO THE CITY MANAGER OF VANCOUVER
NOVEMBER 7, 2013

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The members of the Community Task Force (CTF) were appointed by the Vancouver City Manager and asked to act as a sounding board, providing a community perspective on changes recommended as part of an independent assessment of the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) completed by the International City Managers' Association (ICMA). The City Manager asked the CTF to focus on recommendations that would potentially affect the level of service provided to the community. The CTF has completed that review and is providing the Manager with this report summarizing the results of the process.

The March 2013 ICMA report made 16 major recommendations and many sub-recommendations. Of the recommendations, the Manager and the VPD determined that a citizen review of four critical operational recommendations would be appropriate.

The recommendations are:

- Addition of a fourth shift (midday shift)
- Department reorganization with reinstatement of lieutenant rank
- Differential police response deployment model (including triaging of calls for service)
- Alarm ordinance revision (enhanced verification system)

The CTF was asked to review background material pertinent to each of the issues, query both management and labor as to the foreseen and unforeseen impacts on community service, and either endorse or decline the VPD's proposed response. The CTF was also asked to become familiar with another ICMA recommendation regarding patrol shift schedule changes. This is a complex issue and one that is a mandatory subject of bargaining with the labor organizations, and the CTF was not asked to make a recommendation on the shift schedule at this time.

In completing its work over a series of seven meetings, the CTF called on additional resources, including substantial background documents. In addition, a Technical Resource Team participated in each meeting and included representatives of each of VPD's labor organizations and support personnel, Clark Regional Emergency Services Agency (CRESA), and City of Vancouver budget office staff.

As indicated in the following report, the CTF was able to reach a broad consensus on each of the VPD-proposed responses to the four specified ICMA recommendations. Furthermore, the CTF is providing feedback to the Manager regarding any outstanding concerns that could result from the proposed changes. In addition, where applicable, the CTF suggests metrics to monitor whether the changes are creating the anticipated results.

The CTF believes that the changes proposed by the VPD can improve overall operations and efficiency of the department. However, the CTF believes that this alone will not solve the

problems resulting from both past budget and staffing cuts and the fiscal constraints that are predicted. The CTF believes strongly that any monetary savings that result from efficiencies created by implementing the recommended changes should flow back to the VPD to be used for staffing. It is clear to the CTF that the VPD is understaffed for a city of our size, and, while the CTF appreciates the economic realities the City faces, the CTF believe that public safety should be a priority and that funding must be made available to staff the department adequately.

The CTF recognizes that the department is going through a time of significant change, but believes that with continued coordination between management and labor unions these changes can result in greater efficiencies, improved communication, heightened morale within the department, and ultimately in improved service to the community.

INTRODUCTION

Although budget reductions and staffing changes have presented the police department of the City of Vancouver with many challenges over the last several years, the department has continued to provide a high level of service to the community. The resignation of Chief Cliff Cook in September 2012 offered an opportunity to evaluate the department's existing operations and structure and provide appropriate direction for the selection of a new Chief in this time of change. The City contracted with the International City Managers' Association (ICMA) to complete an independent assessment of the department to provide the City and the future Chief with a clearer understanding of the issues and challenges the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) faces.

In April 2013, the City Manager, in partnership with the department, began to evaluate the ICMA recommendations that could affect operations. Because of their potential impact on service delivery and therefore on the community, in July 2013, the City Manager elected to involve a citizens group, the Community Task Force (CTF), tasked with providing a community perspective on the recommended operational changes.

The CTF was asked to act as a sounding board for the VPD as it continues its careful ongoing evaluation of the ICMA recommendations that could affect operations. The service review by the CTF is the subject of this report. The report describes the process and conclusions of the review and includes the suggestions of the CTF for measuring the recommendations' success.

In addition to the recommendations the CTF reviewed, the department is handling many other ICMA recommendations internally because they do not have as great an impact on the level of service to the community. While the CTF believes that all ICMA recommendations should be vetted fully to ensure that all opportunities for improvement are considered, it understands that the CTF process could not accommodate a review of all the ICMA recommendations within its 4-month lifespan.

The report includes the following sections:

- An overview describing the CTF service review process and listing the participants;
- A background section describing the ICMA evaluation and report as well as information about the department's current status, including the department's service area, organizational structure, staffing levels, service delivery model, financial constraints, and relationship with CRESA;
- A review of the ICMA operational recommendations evaluated by the CTF, including any suggestions to alter the recommendations in order to better match the needs of the community and suggested measures of success;
- A discussion of alternative patrol shift schedules;
- A section including other considerations that the CTF believe are important for the City to consider as part of the evaluation of proposed changes; and
- A conclusion summarizing the major points of the report.

PROCESS OVERVIEW

As noted above, as part of the service review, the City Manager elected to involve a citizens group, the CTF, in the process. Its members, who were appointed by the City Manager, represent diverse backgrounds and experiences. Table 1 lists the 17 community members who served on the CTF.

Table 1. CTF Members and Their Representation

CTF MEMBER	TITLE AND/OR GROUP REPRESENTATION
Winston Asai	Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Columbia Machine
Sharif Burdzik	Vice President, Riverview Community Bank
Wilfredo Collins	Member, League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC)
John Deeder	Superintendent, Evergreen Public School District
Betsy Henning	CEO and Founder, AHA! Communications Firm
Mick Hoffman	Director of Safety, Security and Athletics, Vancouver Public School District
Michelle Hurdle-Bradford	Social Change Program Manager, YWCA of Clark County
Franklin Johnson	Neighborhood representative, Bennington Neighborhood
Dan Keteri	Vice President of Patient Care Services, PeaceHealth Southwest Medical Center
Ross Montgomery	Neighborhood representative, Airport Green Neighborhood and NOW Volunteer
Eric Olmsted	President, On Line Support, Inc.
Lee Rafferty	Executive Director, Vancouver's Downtown Association
Leilani Russell	Owner, Leilani Russell & Associates (Cross Cultural Communication/Equity & Inclusion)
James Senescu	Attorney, Private Practice. Previously a Clark County Prosecuting Attorney
Paul Speer	Community Member, works with a variety of nonprofit and community organizations
Steven Webb	Superintendent, Vancouver Public School District
Bob Williamson	Vice President of Administrative Services, Clark College

The CTF's primary role was to provide a community perspective and feedback on the implementation of proposed changes to the department's delivery of services. The CTF met seven times over 4 months, with a final meeting to present the report to the City Manager. The meetings were facilitated by an impartial professional facilitator who led the sessions and coordinated with the Technical Resource Team (TRT) and City staff to support the meeting agendas and presentations.

The primary role of the TRT and City staff during the meetings was to provide background information and data regarding the ICMA service delivery recommendations. The ICMA recommendations for improved service delivery and more efficient use of resources that would be presented to the CTF were selected by the TRT in coordination with the City Manager. The TRT and City staff also responded to questions and requests for additional information from CTF members. Table 2 lists the TRT members and City staff involved in the process.

Table 2. TRT Members

TRT MEMBER		TITLE
Chris Sutter	(Police)	Interim Police Chief
Mike Lester	(Police)	Acting Assistant Police Chief
Marla Anderson	(Police)	Commander
Dave King	(Police)	Commander and Command Union Representative
Jeff Kipp	(Police)	Sergeant and President, Vancouver Police Officer's Guild (VPOG)
Neil Martin	(Police)	Corporal and Vice-President, Vancouver Police Officer's Guild (VPOG)
Connie Bridges	(Police)	Financial Systems Analyst
Teri Kenning	(Police)	Chief's Administrative Assistant
Barbara Ayers	(City)	Communications Manager
Jan Bader	(City)	Program & Policy Development Manager
Natasha Ramras	(City)	Budget & Planning Manager

This report is the result of the various ideas and potential solutions raised over the course of the seven CTF meetings. A summary of topics discussed during the meetings follows. All meetings were held in 2013.

- Meeting 1 (July 11) – Introductions of CTF and TRT members, review of CTF charge, review and approval of CTF charter, adoption of ground rules, set meeting schedule, hear overview of ICMA report and recommendations.
- Meeting 2 (July 30) – Instructions for SharePoint site (for background documents) and presentation of Vancouver Police Department 101.
- Meeting 3 (August 29) – Continue the Vancouver Police Department 101 presentation, discuss fourth shift recommendation.
- Meeting 4 (September 12) –CTF process and ICMA recommendations, decide to move forward with fourth shift recommendation, discuss recommendation to reinstate lieutenant positions, hear crime trends presentation.
- Meeting 5 (September 26) – Hear City financial overview presentation and Clark Regional Emergency Services Agency (CRESA) presentation.
- Meeting 6 (October 10) – Hear overview of calls for service (CFS)/differential police response (DPR) and alarm ordinance revision recommendations.
- Meeting 7 (October 24) – Discuss shift schedule options.
- Final Meeting (November 7) – Present CTF final report to City Manager.

Throughout this process, the CTF followed the framework and operating principles laid out in the CTF charter (approved during the July 11, 2013 meeting) that identified the goal of the CTF

and its roles and responsibilities (see Appendix A). The goal as stated in the charter and as approved by the CTF follows:

Provide community feedback to the Police Chief and City Manager in ensuring that the City of Vancouver is deploying their limited police resources in a way that meets the community's highest needs in protecting life and property and minimizing the occurrence of crime. Provide transparency and accountability in implementation of recommended changes to service delivery.

BACKGROUND

As context for the ICMA operational recommendations discussed later in this report, the next sections present key background information that relates to the ICMA report and the current VPD service area, organizational structure, staffing levels, service delivery model, financial constraints, and a discussion of the departments interdependent relationship with CRESA.

ICMA Report

As noted above, with the resignation of the former Chief in September 2012, the City elected to retain ICMA to complete an independent assessment of the VPD. The ICMA evaluation included an analysis of the department's operations and organizational design to determine if staffing was appropriate for the community and its demographics and crime levels. ICMA completed its evaluation over a period of 4 months.

The report stated that, given its currently available resources, the department provides a high level of services to the community. However, the report also noted that reductions in personnel and budget cuts have resulted in a fragmented organization subject to internal turmoil. The ICMA recommendations focused on stabilizing the department while improving service delivery to the community. The introduction to the report identified 16 major recommendations (see Appendix B) and the body of the report contained many sub-recommendations.

The report stated that if the recommendations were implemented, ICMA believed the department would be staffed and organized in a more streamlined manner that would better serve the community. As stated above, while the CTF understands that its review process focused on a subset of the ICMA recommendations that would have a direct effect on operations, all reasonable ICMA recommendations should be evaluated. (The CTF is well aware that not all of the ICMA recommendations will work well for Vancouver, and suggests considering the needs of this community when evaluating the ICMA recommendations.)

Service Area

The department's current service area is divided into two precincts, with two districts in each precinct, and into 16 beats (Figure 1). The service area covers approximately 49 square miles and serves approximately 164,500 residents. For a historical perspective, in the early 1990s, the department served about 57,000 people. The boundaries of the service area were revised approximately 5 years ago, with the revisions based on factors that included call load and neighborhood and geographical boundaries.




Figure 1. Department Service Area

Organizational Structure

The current organizational chart shows a command team of 11 (a chief, 2 assistant chiefs, and 8 commanders) supported by 35 sergeants, 17 corporals, and 129 officers. Currently, 22.5 civilian staff and 133 volunteers work for the department. Budget reductions and reorganization resulted in the January 2011 elimination of the lieutenant rank, a change that reportedly had negative effects on departmental communication and morale. Internal departmental lines of communication and external lines to the community were affected, and the CTF sees this is a major concern for service delivery. As discussed below, the CTF supports recommendations that will result in improved communication.

Staffing Levels

The department's service area is organized into the 16 beats shown in Figure 1. With a current budget that provides 190 sworn staff, the department does not always have 16 officers on duty to cover each of the beats. The CTF understands that, compared to cities of similar size, Vancouver has a lower level of staffing. In addition, staffing levels have not kept pace with population growth in the service area (see Figure 2).¹ While the department provides excellent policing services to the community, the necessary staff is not available to provide some services (e.g., a property crimes detective and DUI team) that are commonly provided by other police departments.

¹ Note that the projected decrease is based on the potential loss of 18 grant-funded positions.




Figure 2. Department Staffing Levels

Service Delivery Model

The service delivery model implemented by the former Chief was based on the territorial command or beat level model; this model assigns staff to work within a distinct geographical area; officers are assigned to a specific beat and commanders cover a district. According to the department, adequately covering all beats 24/7 with this model would require a staff of approximately 235. Given the recession, the consequent budget cuts to the department, and the ongoing slow recovery, sufficient staff has simply not been available to operate using this model. The ICMA report acknowledged this fact, noting that personnel reductions had left the department with insufficient staff for this labor-intensive territorial command model.

The department currently uses three shifts to staff patrol; each shift is 10.5 hours long in a 5/4, 5/4, 5/5 cycle. In the first two cycles, staff works five days on and has four days off; in the third cycle, staff has five days on and five days off. According to the ICMA report, from the perspective of deployment and staffing, this shift schedule is inefficient and wasteful – the overlap that results during shift changes does not align well with demands for service. The ICMA conclusion is not supported by the VPD labor organizations.

Current and Projected Budget

The total VPD budget for 2013 is approximately \$31.7 million with an additional \$1.7 million in grants and contracts. Of that budget (Figure 3), approximately 74 percent goes to staffing (190 sworn officers, 22.5 civilian staff), 5 percent to operating costs (electricity, equipment, training, etc.), 12 percent to Clark County (to pay for contracts), and 9 percent to the City (payment of vehicles, IT services, etc.). The department is funded entirely by the City’s General Fund.




Figure 3. 2013 Department Budget

The City’s chief fiscal concern is its structural deficit – the growth in revenues has not kept pace with the growth in expenditures. This concern affects nearly every department, but is particularly troubling in the case of critical public services such as public safety. Opportunities for revenue increases are limited while expenditures grow in tandem with population growth and inflation, leading in turn to the structural deficit, the need to balance the City budget, and cuts in departmental budgets. While the public safety departments have been mostly spared from reductions, the recent recession did require cuts to the fire and police department budgets.

The CTF understands the current budget constraints and structural deficit facing the department and City; however, it seems unlikely that implementing the ICMA recommendations can address long-term budget concerns. The recommendations may provide greater short-term financial stability, but the CTF acknowledges that additional funding will likely be needed if the department is expected to maintain service levels given the growth of the community and the parallel demand for police services.

Clark Regional Emergency Services Agency (CRESA)

CRESA is the regional public safety agency that handles all 9-1-1 calls and dispatch for the VPD. As part of the service review process, representatives from CRESA provided background information about the services the agency provides and how they relate to the VPD (see Appendix C). Changes to VPD operations and service delivery, especially any proposed changes to call response, will likely impact CRESA operations. As a result of this interdependent relationship, it is vitally important that the VPD and CRESA have open lines of communication to ensure that any proposed service delivery changes do not result in potential

negative impacts to CRESA. The City and the VPD have expressed their intentions to work closely with CRESA to ensure that changes within the VPD do not result in increased workloads for CRESA without prior consideration of those impacts.

REVIEW OF RECOMMENDATIONS

As explained in the introduction, the City retained ICMA to assess the department to provide the City and the future Chief with a clearer understanding of the issues and challenges the VPD faces. As part of the department's careful review of the ICMA recommendations, the CTF was asked to evaluate the recommendations that would directly affect levels of service. These recommendations were selected for CTF review because their implementation would have an impact on service delivery and therefore on the community.

The recommendations include the following: adding a fourth shift; reorganizing the department, including reinstating the rank of lieutenant; implementing differential police response (including how CFS are handled); and revising the alarm ordinance. For each recommendation considered by the CTF, this section explains the ICMA recommendation, gives relevant background information, and states its potential benefits and whether the CTF supports moving forward with its implementation. This section also lists concerns and suggestions raised by the CTF and proposes measures for the success of the recommendation once implemented.

Recommendation 1: Fourth Shift

The ICMA report suggested that the VPD implement a fourth (midday) shift to improve coverage during times of higher call volume. The department proposes that the midday shift occur between the hours of 1000 to 2030, with a minor shift in the start time of the swing shift (from 1500 to 1600) to ensure appropriate overlap of shift schedules. Adopting a fourth shift would allow more shift overlap and overall better distribution of officers during critical hours of higher call volume. While the fourth shift is part of the current labor contract, and therefore will not require any negotiations, the change of start time for the swing shift is subject to bargaining and will require a Memorandum of Understanding with the Vancouver Police Officer's Guild (VPOG).

A 2004 implementation of the midday shift in the East Precinct did not work well. As a result of staffing shortages at that time, the midday shift was often used as a resource to backfill and maintain minimum staffing requirements; therefore, its potential benefits were not fully realized. In order to avoid a similar problem and to attain the potential benefits described below, it will be important to staff the proposed fourth shift adequately.

The potential benefits of the fourth shift recommendation include the following:

- Improving the alignment of deployed officers with calls for service
- Opportunity to implement proactive policing strategies²
- Projected decrease of approximately \$291,000 in overtime costs

² Proactive policing strategies include the use of focused patrols, officers engaging in the community, and following up on tips and leads. The goal is to prevent crime from occurring, instead of responding after a crime has occurred.

-
- Requires no additional budget, staff, resources, or capital expenses (i.e., additional vehicles) for implementation

The proposed addition of the fourth shift would not reduce the overall numbers of officers on patrol, but would reduce the number of officers during the grave shift from 14 to 12. This barebones approach should work, but if more than two critical incidents occur at any given time on the grave shift, the officers would need to request backup. Following the CRESA presentation, Interim Chief Chris Sutter acknowledged that deploying additional field staff could affect the number of calls received by CRESA. Chief Sutter stated that the department would continue to work closely with CRESA to ensure that implementing the fourth shift recommendation and other proposed changes would not result in an additional workload for dispatchers without mitigating for those effects.

The department proposed to implement the fourth shift for a one year trial period, starting in January 2014. However, adding the fourth shift with the proposed change in swing shift schedule, required negotiations with the VPOG. These negotiations were not completed in time to implement the fourth shift change in 2014.

CTF Recommendation

Implement the fourth shift for a 1-year trial period as soon as agreement can be reached with the VPOG.

Concerns and Suggestions

The CTF recognized that the fourth shift recommendation appears to be a win-win recommendation that has the support of management and the VPOG. The concerns and suggestions raised by the CTF include the following:

- The CTF believe that negotiations regarding the fourth shift should be a top priority for the department and the CTF recommends that these negotiations occur in a timely manner.
- How can the department analyze the results of the fourth shift if other organizational changes occur at the same time?
- What are the potential impacts or risks associated with decreasing the grave shift from 14 to 12 officers?
- What are the potential impacts or risks to officers as a result of the fourth shift?
- How will the department ensure that the fourth shift is staffed adequately and is not used to backfill other shifts as occurred in 2004?
- Are there potential costs associated with the addition of the fourth shift that would offset potential cost savings?
- In addition to cost savings, is there another quantitative measurement the department can use to see if the fourth shift is meeting expectations?
- The TRT should propose benchmarks to the CTF that the TRT believes would help determine the effectiveness of the fourth shift.

Measures of Success

The City can use the following measures to judge the success of the implementation of a fourth shift:

- Has the change decreased costs by approximately \$291,000?
- Has the reduction of the grave shift by two officers affected service calls and the department's ability to provide adequate coverage?
- Has the addition of a fourth shift had any positive impact on officer health and safety (i.e., decreased number of lost time days)?
- Has the addition of a fourth shift improved the alignment of deployed officers with calls for service?
- Has the addition of a fourth shift provided the department with more opportunity to implement proactive policing strategies?
- Has the addition of a fourth shift, with the accompanying increase in proactive policing strategies, resulted in a decrease in crime rates?

Recommendation 2: Department Reorganization with Reinstatement of Lieutenant Rank

The ICMA report recommended that the VPD reinstate the rank of lieutenant with 9 to 11 lieutenants, reduce the number of commanders from 8 to 4, and reduce the numbers of sergeants and corporals. The reorganization also proposed the addition of 10 new sworn positions and 2 civilian crime scene investigators. Paying for the additional staff involved in implementing this ICMA recommendation would cost approximately \$1.3 million in additional funding each year. Because budget constraints prevent the full implementation of the ICMA recommendation, the department provided the CTF with two versions of the recommendation that would allow the reinstatement of the lieutenant's rank and the reorganization of the department within the limits of the currently authorized and funded positions.

The CTF chose to recommend that the department move forward with the VPD's Option 1. That option would reduce the total number of commanders by 3 for a total of 5, reinstate 6 lieutenants, and reduce the number of sergeants by 3. Option 1 would result in approximately \$8,000 in additional staffing costs per year. (Note: actual personnel costs associated with this option may change as a result of potential labor negotiations associated with the implementation of this change.)

Option 2 would ultimately arrive at the same organizational structure as described in Option 1, but the change in structure would occur over time through retirements and promotions. It is believed that this change could be completed in approximately 1 year. Option 2 would begin with the retention of the 7 current commanders (1 commander position is vacant), the reinstatement of 4 lieutenant positions, and the reduction in the number of sergeants by 3. This option would cost approximately \$31,000 in additional staffing costs. The CTF chose not to pursue this option because it would be more costly and would take longer to achieve the preferred organizational structure.

The potential benefits of both options 1 and 2 would include the following.

- Enhanced operational effectiveness
- Improved communication with the community
- Improved communication between front line staff and management
- Additional pathways for internal succession and leadership development
- Improved department morale
- Does not require additional staff to implement

The department proposed to implement the reorganization with reinstatement of the rank of lieutenant effective January 1, 2014. However, this change required negotiations with the Command Union, which were not completed in time to implement the change in 2014.

CTF Recommendation

Implement the reorganization with reinstatement of lieutenant rank (option 1) as soon as agreement can be reached with the Command Union.

Concerns and Suggestions

While the CTF understood that the reorganization and reinstatement of the lieutenant's rank had to be decided before the start of schedule negotiations, CTF members raised the following concerns and suggestions:

- How will lieutenant schedules be determined? The department acknowledged that any change in schedules would require negotiations.
- Will the reorganization work well with the fourth shift? The department stated that the change would work well.
- Lieutenants responsible for patrol and operations should be located within the precincts.
- Lieutenant shifts should overlap with the staff who report to them.
- The TRT should propose benchmarks to the CTF that the TRT believes would help determine the effectiveness of the fourth shift.

Measures of Success

The City can use the following measures to judge the success of the reorganization and reinstatement of the rank of lieutenant:

- Has the increased cost to the department been no more than \$8,000 per year?
- How can the department determine if this change has resulted in improved operational effectiveness?
- Have the changes resulted in improved communication with the community?
- Have the changes resulted in improved department morale and internal communications?

Recommendation 3: Differential Police Response

This section discusses two ICMA recommendations: calls for service (CFS) and differential police response (DPR). The ICMA report recommended that the VPD implement a CFS committee and a DPR model of deployment. These two recommendations were meant to be considered together; however, because the department has had a CFS committee in place since 2010 that works on improving CFS triage, no further discussion of the CFS recommendation was considered necessary. The CTF did, however, review the work of the CFS committee and agreed with the proposed changes to CFS triage and response.

Because the work of the CFS committee is in turn important for the DPR recommendation, the CTF was provided with an overview of the following ICMA CFS recommendation:

Create a calls for service (CFS) committee made up of members of the department and stakeholders in the community with a mission of evaluating how CFS are received and dispatched in Vancouver in order to develop methods to screen and triage calls more effectively.

The CFS committee includes staff and representatives of both the department and CRESA. The committee has been working on (1) determining whether types of calls are matched appropriately with their currently assigned priority level and (2) proposing changes to call response if any are needed.

While the CFS committee has been continuing its work, it has also considered some of the suggestions made in the ICMA report, including reevaluating current response protocols for certain call priority types to ensure that the department uses its limited resources in the most efficient manner. These suggested changes to response would be implemented as part of the recommendation of deploying DPR.

While the department has been working over the past couple of years on improving call triage and response, the ICMA recommendation would involve more aggressive triaging and would formalize the DPR deployment model.

This is the ICMA DPR recommendation:

Explore the creation of a differential response function for nonemergency calls and past occurrences so as to supplement the current web-based reporting system.

The key to the DPR model is matching resources to the type of call received. The key benefit of this change would be improving the use of limited department resources and allowing officers to spend time on higher priority functions. If officers no longer respond to lower priority calls or after lower priority crimes occur, officers can increase the amount of time they spend on proactive policing.

The department currently has set responses for the various call priority types. For example, a baseline number of department officers responds to call types reporting an imminent threat to life or property. However, in the case of non-emergency crimes (i.e., cold thefts, nuisance complaints) with no suspect information, citizens are encouraged to use the online reporting

service Cop Logic or to report the crime by telephone to a police service technician. While this type of call triage and DPR style of deployment are currently used by the department, the department proposes to formalize this model and triage calls even more aggressively than in the recent past.

The department will ensure that any change to call response includes a public outreach and education plan. The department recognizes that it is important to adjust the expectations of the community and educate members of the public. The public outreach and education plan would include effective communications that explain why an officer will not respond to every type of 9-1-1 call.

The potential benefits of the DPR deployment model include the following:

- Improved use of current staffing
- Estimated 12 percent reduction in CFS currently responded to by officers
- Frees officers' time for other duties (e.g., focused patrols, proactive policing)
- Does not require additional staff or resources

The department proposes to implement the DPR deployment model.

CTF Recommendation

Implement the DPR deployment model with an effective public education and outreach plan.

Concerns and Suggestions

CTF members raised the following concerns and suggestions.

- What is the potential impact to response times for lower priority calls?
- How will this deployment model affect CRESA's workload?
- What are potential increased costs associated with proactive policing (e.g., additional jail costs and/or costs related to increased demand for dispatch services)?
- How will the department ensure that the roll out of the DPR model is communicated adequately to all staff? The ICMA report noted that some staff reported that the department does not triage calls and will respond to all calls.
- How can the current online reporting website be set up to provide a more detailed response when a citizen files a report?
- Implement a public outreach plan to help educate the community about the proposed changes in service delivery.
- Consider the additional costs of implementing a public outreach plan.
- Consider methods to assist citizens needing additional emotional support following a crime, even if that crime would not warrant an officer's response because of the crime's lower priority level (e.g., not-in-progress home break-ins).

Measures of Success

The City can use the following measures to judge the success of DPR.

- Have focused patrols/proactive policing resulted in a decrease in crime rates?
- Has the percentage of time officers respond to 9-1-1 calls decreased (should be at or below 60 percent of an officer's time per ICMA)?
- Has officers' understanding of and satisfaction with the DPR model been assessed? What are the results?
- Was a comprehensive community education plan rolled out before the implementation of DPR? Has only limited negative community feedback been received?
- When followed up with community members at a specified point after DPR implementation (i.e., 6 months or 1 year), what is the public reaction to the change?
- Has there been any negative effect on the workload of CRESA dispatch services?

Recommendation 4: Alarm Ordinance Revision

With the increasing use of alarms in both businesses and residences, the number of false alarm calls has been increasing. Approximately 90 percent of all alarm calls to the VPD are false alarms. Deploying an officer to an alarm call that turns out to be false pulls important resources from other duties unnecessarily. A department alarm response committee researched possible solutions to this growing problem, and a review of the practices of other cities shows that changes in how alarm responses are regulated can reduce false alarms very successfully.

The ICMA report stated that across the industry, as high as 98 percent of all alarm calls are false alarms, typically resulting from user error. The report added that the department should address alarm response in the community aggressively. Suggesting that the department consider implementing an alarm call-back program, the report stated that such a program could decrease the number of false alarm calls significantly.

The department alarm response committee considered two options for revised alarm regulations. Option 1 is enhanced call verification and Option 2 is verified response. They are described below.

Option 1: An enhanced call verification system would require the monitoring center to make a minimum of two calls to registered owners, with two alarms tripped prior to requesting police dispatch. It is estimated that this change would reduce false alarms by approximately 75 percent, or approximately 930 alarm responses a year, which would free an estimated 465 officer hours.

Option 2: A verified response system would require secondary verification, through either human, noise, or video surveillance, to confirm criminal activity prior to police dispatch. It is estimated that this change would reduce false alarms by approximately 93 percent, or approximately 1,153 alarms a year, which would free an estimated 577 officer hours.

The department alarm committee prefers Option 1 because of public safety concerns related to Option 2. Requiring the secondary verification of alarms would put the public at higher risk

because a person might need to verify criminal activity before police response. In addition, alarm companies do not favor Option 2 because requiring verification on site – whether by a human or by video or noise surveillance – would increase the cost of alarm systems.

The department will ensure that any change to its current policy regarding its response to alarm calls includes a public outreach and education plan. The department recognizes that it is important to adjust the expectations of the community and educate the public. The public outreach and education plan would include communications that explain the changes in department response to alarms.

The potential benefits of changing the alarm regulations include the following.

- Estimated 75 percent reduction in false alarms (equating to approximately 930 alarm responses in one year)
- Frees officers' time for other duties (e.g., focused patrols, proactive policing)
- Reduced 9-1-1 call volume, reducing dispatcher workload
- Does not require additional staff or resources

The department proposes to present a revised alarm ordinance based on enhanced verification (Option 1) to the City Council for approval.

CTF Recommendation

The CTF endorsed moving forward with the enhanced verification alarm ordinance (Option 1) as long as a public education and outreach plan accompanies its implementation.

Concerns and Suggestions

CTF members raised the following concerns and suggestions.

- What is the potential that some alarms are not responded to when they are in fact real burglaries? Does this pose additional risk to the community?
- What improvements may be made to the alarm permit fee structure as part of approval of a revised alarm ordinance? The City Council should consider changes to the fee structure as part of the alarm ordinance revisions.
- Will there be any improvements to the alarm permit reporting system? The department said that the alarm permit reporting system is currently being improved. The new system would be web-based and more streamlined.
- Will need to determine how schools and other public agencies with alarm systems are managed if an alarm is triggered.
- Implement a public outreach plan to educate the community about the proposed changes in alarm response.
- Will need to consider the additional costs of implementing a public outreach plan.

Measures of Success

The City can judge the success of the revised alarm ordinance by using the following measures.

- Has the change resulted in a decrease in 9-1-1 calls for false alarms?
- Has the number of false alarms decreased by approximately 75 percent?
- Has there been no increase in burglary rates?
- Was a comprehensive community education plan rolled out before the implementation of the revised ordinance?
- When followed up with community members at a specified point after implementation (i.e., 6 months or 1 year), what is the public reaction to the change?

PATROL SHIFT SCHEDULE ALTERNATIVES

According to the ICMA report, from the perspective of deployment and staffing, the department's current shift schedule is inefficient and wasteful – the overlap that results during shift changes does not align well with demands for service. The ICMA report recommended that the VPD "... seek to modify the shift schedule to more appropriately align the schedule to meet the demands of the community." In some measure, this more appropriate alignment is accomplished through the fourth shift recommendation that was discussed previously in this report. The VPD and the CTF agree that the fourth shift recommendation should be implemented. However, the ICMA report stated that the VPD should also evaluate potential alternatives to the current schedule of patrol shifts to create greater efficiencies within the department.

While the ICMA report stated that the current schedule of patrol shifts is inefficient and alternatives should be considered, survey results reported that VPD staff members are very satisfied with the current schedule and likely would not support changes. The ICMA report acknowledged that, in the past, organizational changes have resulted in disruptions and mistrust within the VPD.

ICMA suggested that any proposed changes to the schedule of patrol shifts should be implemented carefully and only after a new Chief has had the opportunity to gain the trust and respect of the department. It is important to note that any changes to the current shift schedule is a mandatory subject of bargaining with the VPOG and as a result, the VPD presented this as a review of the current schedule and possible alternative schedules. The VPD did not recommend any schedule changes at this time, but did request input and suggestions from the CTF. The longer-term plan is to have the CTF reconvene in the spring when a new Chief has been selected and the issue of alternative patrol shift schedules can be revisited.

VPD Patrol Shift Schedule: The VPD's patrol division currently consists of 18 sergeants, 10 corporals, and 62 officers. The division is on duty 24/7/365. The department currently uses two groups (A and B) and three shifts to staff patrol; each shift is 10.5 hours long in a 5/4, 5/4, 5/5 cycle. In the first two cycles, staff works five days on and has four days off; in the third cycle, staff has five days on and five days off. This schedule allows the VPD to have two overlapping days each month when both the A and B groups are working. This allows adequate patrol coverage while half of the patrol division has time to complete required trainings.

The ICMA report noted that the 10.5-hour shift unnecessarily creates longer workdays for officers. The three shifts used in the current schedule are the day shift from 6 AM to 4:30 PM, the swing shift from 3 PM to 1:30 AM, and the grave shift from 8 PM to 6:30 AM. This results in a 1.5-hour overlap between the day and swing shifts, a 5.5-hour overlap between the swing and grave shifts, and a 30-minute overlap between the grave and day shifts. The ICMA report noted that this results in 7.5 hours of overlap each day that are not optimally designed to meet times of increased demand for service. The ICMA report also stated that the timing of the overlap creates inefficiencies in patrol coverage and costs approximately 15 percent more for staff than is necessary to provide the same service levels. The VPD believes that the majority of these concerns raised by ICMA are best addressed through the implementation of the fourth shift and not with a proposed change in the schedule of patrol shifts.

With respect to a discussion related to shift length, the VPD provided research that showed that a 10-hour shift has been shown to be the optimum shift length for patrol when compared to 8- and 12-hour shifts. The argument for the 10-hour shift over the other alternatives is that the 10-hour shift results in less overtime worked compared to an 8-hour shift, and does not result in officer fatigue commonly reported by officers working a 12-hour shift. The VPD believes that the current 10.5-hour shift is optimum for the department based on both research and how the department currently operates.

The VPD identified the following benefits to the current schedule:

- Provides 7.5 hours of overlapping coverage with time to handle administrative responsibilities. (Note: the ICMA report identified that this overlap was not optimally designed to meet the times of increased demand, but the fourth shift recommendation would address this.)
- Reduces officer fatigue, allowing time for recovery.
- Strong recruitment tool for the department; officers value the current schedule.
- Provides adequate training time for staff.
- Provides two weekends off each month for officers.

The VPD identified the following negatives to the current schedule;

- The three shift times do not align optimally with demand for service. (Note: this can be addressed through the implementation of the fourth shift recommendation.)
- Potential extended delays responding to citizen requests. (Note: this is a concern only when a resident is trying to reach a specific officer; however, in most cases, other officers are able to respond to requests for follow up.)

The VPD explained that changes to the schedule, including the proposed addition of a fourth shift, could help the department improve operations and use current resources more efficiently. However, any changes made to shift schedules will not result in significant additional staff on the street, only a redistribution of current staff. The VPD emphasized that, while it is important for the department to consider improvements that better meet the demand curve, it is important to keep in mind that redistributing current staff will not solve all the problems that come from

having fewer-than-optimal resources to serve the community. Any proposed changes to patrol shift schedules must consider officer health and well-being, as well as improved operations and efficiencies for the department. The VPD feel strongly that a police department's most important resource is its officers, and ensuring officers' physical and mental fitness is vital to that department's success.

Alternative Shift Schedules:

The VPD provided an overview of the ICMA recommended shift schedule as well as patrol shift schedules employed by other police departments around the country. As stated above, the overview is provided only for informational purposes and no one option is being currently recommended for the VPD.

ICMA Shift Schedule: The ICMA report suggested a 4 on, 4 off schedule that used the same shift length (10.5 hours) and overlap in schedules (7.5 hours) currently used by the VPD as well as the same A and B groups. The VPD stated that the proposed ICMA schedule does not result in any gained efficiencies for the department, as it results in fewer overall hours worked per year (1,916 vs. 2,048) with the same level of compensation and no overlapping days for training. The VPD does not believe that this schedule would improve operations and result in efficiencies and that it likely would cost more in overtime.

Spokane, WA Shift Schedule: This schedule is similar to the VPD schedule but includes a fourth shift and uses four groups on a 5/4, 5/4, 5/5 schedule with a 10.6-hour shift. The VPD stated that this schedule provides similar benefits as the VPD schedule, but that Spokane has a larger department and more supervisors, which this type of schedule requires. This schedule provides more overlap – 17.33 hours of overlap compared to the 7.5 hours of overlap in the VPD schedule.

Antioch, CA Shift Schedule: This 5/2, 3/4 schedule uses two groups, with three shifts, and a 10-hour shift. The VPD stated that this schedule provides 6 hours of overlap. It provides training days, but also shorter recovery time for officers and less shift overlap.

4/3 Shift Schedule: Another schedule used by many departments across the country is the 4/3 shift schedule with two groups, using either three or four shifts, with a 10-hour shift length. This schedule allows overlap on Wednesdays for training and 6 hours of overlap. The VPD stated that this schedule does provide training days, but includes less overlap hours and allows no full weekends off for officers.

VPOG Perspective:

Jeff Kipp (VPOG President) stated that he thinks the CTF can understand why officers prefer to work the current schedule of patrol shifts. He said that the schedule provides officers with sufficient recovery time that allows them to spend time with family and decompress. He acknowledged that other schedules might work better in larger police departments because staff would not work any specific schedule for a long period. However, in a smaller department, officers can end up working the same schedule for a longer time and, if the schedule does not provide a good balance, this can result in challenges for officers.

The VPOG supports the fourth shift recommendation. However, the current patrol shift schedule and length of shift work well for the department and he does not see the VPOG supporting any recommendations that would alter those aspects of the current patrol shift schedule.

Concerns and Suggestions

CTF members raised the following concerns and suggestions related to the discussion of patrol shift schedules.

- Many of the concerns ICMA raised regarding shift schedules may be resolved with the implementation of the fourth shift recommendation and the CTF believes that the fourth shift should be a top priority of the department to ensure that patrol shifts are aligned with times of greatest demand (critical for both crime reduction and improving community contact).
- It is important to consider the potential health implications of any changes to the patrol shift schedule, including proposed changes to shift length.
- Officer and department morale should also be considered when evaluating potential shift schedule changes.
- Shift overlap times and days should ensure that the overlap best meets the demand curve and provides adequate time for training.
- It is important to consider how any proposed change in patrol shift schedules affects the need for increased overtime cost to the department.
- While the CTF recognizes that the department is evaluating opportunities to improve operations and efficiency, it will be important to look at whether or not additional staffing resources are needed to match demands for police services.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The CTF believes strongly that any proposed changes to the VPD must take into consideration what is best for this community and for the department. While the CTF does believe that the four recommendations discussed during this process can improve the department's overall operations and help gain efficiencies, the CTF believes that this alone will not solve the problems related to insufficient staffing levels. It is important that the VPD not only consider structural changes that optimize the use of current resources, but also determine what the appropriate level of staffing should be for this community.

The CTF recommends that the City evaluate what staffing resources would be optimum to meet the demands for police services in the community in addition to optimizing the use of current resource levels. The objective should then be to work toward that optimum number in some sustainable manner. The intent is to disconnect, to the greatest extent possible, the provision of public safety from the ebbs and flows of city budgetary issues. In addition, the CTF strongly encourages the City to consider allowing the VPD to reinvest any cost savings that come from the implementation of these recommendations, rather than returning those savings to the general fund. This reinvestment would not only provide more incentive for the VPD to make changes that result in additional savings, but would allow the reinvestment of those funds into

additional staff – staff that are needed to help meet the growing demand for police services within the community. It is clear that the VPD is currently understaffed for a city of our size and, while the CTF appreciates the economic realities faced by the City, the CTF believes that public safety should be a priority and that funding must be made available to staff the department adequately.

CONCLUSION

The CTF recognizes that the VPD is facing many challenges that have resulted from previous changes in organizational structure and leadership and budget cuts to the department. However, throughout these difficult changes, the overall impact has been mostly imperceptible to most citizens within the community. This can be attributed to the dedication and commitment of all VPD staff to continue to serve the community with the highest level of service, given the limited resources available.

The current selection process for a new Chief provides the department with an opportunity to address these challenges and identify solutions that will be sustainable, yet continue to provide a high level of police services. The review of the ICMA operational recommendations by the CTF that is summarized in this report provides the City and the VPD with a perspective on how these changes may be received by the community as a whole. The report also suggests measures of success to confirm that any changes to police operations are evaluated to ensure they are providing results that work for both the department and the community.

The CTF believes that with continued coordination between management and labor unions, these recommended changes can result in greater efficiencies, improved communication, and heightened morale within the department. Those gains should lead to improved service to the community. The CTF believes that the implementation of recommendations as described in this report will help the department improve the services it provides to the community within the current budgetary limits and with existing resources. However, with continued population growth and demand for services, it will be important to consider how the department can ensure against a decline in the quality of service provided to the community. The City Manager and future Chief must consider how to stabilize the department, not only in the short term and within the current budget, but in the context of increasing population and demand within our community.

Appendix A

Community Task Force Charter

**Vancouver Police Department Service Review
COMMUNITY TASK FORCE
CHARTER**

Task Force Charge

The Task Force will provide a community perspective on implementation of proposed changes to the Vancouver Police Department's delivery of services.

Goal

Provide community feedback to the Police Chief and City Manager in ensuring that the City of Vancouver is deploying their limited police resources in a way that meets the community's highest needs in protecting life and property and minimizing the occurrence of crime. Provide transparency and accountability in implementation of recommended changes to service delivery.

Task Force Role

The City of Vancouver contracted with the International City Manager's Association (ICMA) to conduct an analysis of the Vancouver Police Department's service delivery. The ICMA process included interviews of internal and external stakeholders and an electronic survey of sworn and non-sworn Vancouver Police Department employees in addition to extensive data analysis. The ICMA Report includes a wide range of recommendations for improved service delivery and a more efficient use of resources. ICMA has also constructed screening tools that will be used in selecting the department's new police chief.

The Task Force, with assistance from a professional facilitator, will serve as a sounding board for the Chief and other members of the Vancouver Police Department relative to implementation of the service delivery recommendations from the ICMA's analysis. They will also help identify how to communicate and operationalize those recommendations.

Task Force Appointment

Task Force members are appointed by the City Manager and will work with the Police Chief, City administrative staff and a technical resource team from the Police Department, including union representatives, to vet a set of recommendations for optimizing service delivery.

Time Commitment

7-9, two hour meetings over the course of 6-8 months beginning in July 2013.

Task Force Schedule

Time of Task Force meetings will be determined based on member's schedules.

Task Force Meeting #1

Introductions, overview of process/schedule, agreement on ground rules and review of Community Task Force charter and operating framework

Task Force Meeting #2

Orientation to the Vancouver Police Department (VPD 101)

Task Force Meeting #3

Overview of ICMA recommendations.

Task Force Meeting #4, 5, 6, 7, 8

Review and discussion of specific ICMA recommendations related to service delivery.

Task Force Meeting #9

Task Force feedback and recommendations discussed with the City Manager.

Appendix B

ICMA Major Recommendations

Police Department Final Operations and Data Analysis Report

Vancouver, Washington
March 2013



POLICE OPERATIONS

POLICE OPERATIONS

C E N T E R F O R P U B L I C S A F E T Y M A N A G E M E N T

Submitted by and reply to:
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Leaders at the Core of Better Communities

Ex3078-0030-VAN

Executive Summary

ICMA was commissioned to review the operations of the Vancouver Police Department (VPD). While our analysis covered all aspects of the department's operations, a particular focus of our study was on identifying the appropriate staffing of the agency given its workload, community demographics, and crime levels.

We analyzed departmental workload using operations research methodology¹ and compared that workload to staffing and deployment levels. We reviewed thousands of pages of documents provided by the department to better understand the implications of service demand on current staffing. We looked at the department's organizational design to determine if the many functions required of a modern police agency are staffed appropriately. Our study involved data collection, interviews with key police and administration personnel, on-site observations of the job environment, data analysis, comparative analyses, and development of alternatives and recommendations. Major recommendations appear below and are described in detail throughout the report.

Based on our review, it is our opinion that the VPD provides a high level of service to the Vancouver community with the resources it has. ICMA believes the department is understaffed and lacks direction and focus. Personnel reductions and budget cuts over the last several years have created a fragmented organization. A succession of administrations, each with a different policing philosophy, has contributed to a palpable sense of disorientation with respect to the vision and mission of the department. Years of internal turmoil have had a negative effect on the workplace climate.

The combination of these forces has resulted in a deeply divided organization, which undoubtedly impacts the VPD's ability to provide services. An extended period of dynamic stability, with a return to core organizational principles and services, is strongly recommended. The recommendations provided here seek to rebalance the VPD and begin the process of stabilizing the department and focusing the department on the delivery of outstanding police services to the Vancouver community. Implementation of these recommendations should be undertaken with full participation of all involved stakeholders.

Major Recommendations:

1. Create a calls for service (CFS) committee made up of members of the VPD and stakeholders in the community with a mission of evaluating how CFS are received and dispatched in Vancouver in order to develop methods to screen and triage calls more effectively.
2. Explore the creation of a differential response function for nonemergency calls and past occurrences so as to supplement the current web-based reporting system.
3. Add police officers to the patrol function to support high demand from CFS and administrative activities.
4. Reorganize patrol into two precincts; assign one commander in each precinct.

¹ Operations Research is a discipline that deals with the application of advanced analytical methods to help make better management decisions.

5. Reinstate the rank of lieutenant.
6. Abandon territorial command at the beat level.
7. Embrace a process of case management and vigorous investigation of property crimes.
8. Assign two civilians to a new Crime Scene and Evidence Unit.
9. Merge the Digital Evidence Cybercrime Unit (DECU) and Child Justice Center (CJC).
10. Merge the Safe Streets Gang Task Force (SSGTF) and Drug Task Force (DTF).
11. The VPD should seek accreditation as soon as possible.
12. Establish a system for conducting periodic inspections of all departmental units, following a set checklist of items to be examined, to ensure compliance with agency policies and procedures.
13. Realign the Professional Standards Unit to report directly to the chief of police.
14. Consolidate units and assign personnel to work out of the East or West precincts, except where confidentiality is required. The headquarters facility should be closed and all positions relocated to one of the precincts.
15. Create a leadership team.
16. Institute an informal Labor-Management Committee.

ICMA contends that implementing these recommendations will lead to an improved organization. The “new” organization would have more personnel and would be structured in a way to enhance the delivery of core services and return to its stated mission and purpose. Also, the new organization would be streamlined, making it more efficient and cost-effective. The culmination of these recommendations can be found in Appendix C, where a remodeled organization chart is presented.

The ICMA team thanks the city and police administrations of Vancouver for their assistance in completing this project. In particular, ICMA commends City Manager Eric Holmes and Interim Police Chief Chris Sutter for their enthusiasm and cooperation with the ICMA team regarding documentation requests and the overall project.

Appendix C

CRESA Public Safety Communications Handout



Public Safety Communications

9-1-1 Call Taking and Dispatching

Anna Pendergrass, Director

CRESA— 710 W 13th St, Vancouver, WA 98660

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Executive Summary

CRESA is a regional public safety agency that provides 9-1-1 call taking and dispatch, technology support services, emergency management coordination, and ambulance contract oversight for Emergency Medical Service District #2. This report contains information regarding the working conditions and vulnerabilities of the 9-1-1 Dispatch Operations center. Our goal is to educate the task force on how the 9-1-1 system works, the relationship and dependencies of CRESA and our user agencies, and to broaden the view of the members so when recommendations are made for the City of Vancouver, the impacts of those recommendations might have on CRESA will be considered and included in the final report.

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CRESA Governance & Overview

Clark Regional Emergency Services Agency [CRESA] was established pursuant to RCW 39.34 and the CRESA Interlocal Agreement. Through an Interlocal Agreement, the majority of CRESA's services, including 9-1-1 Dispatch Operations, Administrative Services, Emergency Management and Technical Services, are governed by an Administrative Board comprised of nine board members serving indefinite terms.

The CRESA Administrative Board has the authority and responsibility to provide policy and direction to CRESA and the Agency's administration. The Board appoints the Director, approves the Agency budget, determines what services CRESA will provide, and acts as necessary to further CRESA's goals and purpose. The CRESA Administrative Board convenes monthly in regular meetings open to the public in accordance with RCW 42.30 "Open Public Meetings Act."

9-1-1 Operations

CRESA receives and dispatches all 9-1-1 calls for Clark County and the seven cities in the County, serving over 431,000 citizens. CRESA's 9-1-1 consolidated dispatch center receives and dispatches public safety help for all incorporated and unincorporated areas of Clark County and portions of Cowlitz and Skamania counties and serves 11 law enforcement agencies, all city fire departments and County fire districts, and three ambulance providers. Funding for 9-1-1 dispatch operations is provided by a dedicated excise tax and stakeholder agencies' user fees. The Agency is accredited through the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) and the National Academy of Emergency Dispatchers (NAED).

Operations Staff include the Director, Human Resource Manager, Administrative Staff (4), Technical Staff (4), Operations Division Manager, Training/Quality Assurance Manager, Training / Quality Assurance Specialist (1/2), Dispatch Supervisors (6), Dispatchers (50)

Regional Radio

The Regional Radio System program is responsible for countywide public safety radio communications infrastructure comprised of 800 MHz voice/data, microwave systems, and the VHF county fire radio system. Today, the system serves over 2375 radio units.

Emergency Management

CRESA's Emergency Management Program was established pursuant to RCW 38.52, the CRESA Interlocal Agreement and Contract to provide emergency management for Clark County and the Cities of Battle Ground, Camas, La Center, Ridgefield, Vancouver, Washougal, and Yacolt.

Emergency Medical Services

In accordance with city/county ordinances, Interlocal Agreement, and ambulance contract, the CRESA EMS Program fulfills Clark County EMS

PUBLIC SAFETY STAKEHOLDERS

- ▼ LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
 - ▲ BATTLE GROUND POLICE
 - ▲ BNSF RAILROAD POLICE
 - ▲ CAMAS POLICE
 - ▲ CLARK COUNTY SHERIFF
 - ▲ LA CENTER POLICE
 - ▲ RIDGEFIELD POLICE
 - ▲ VANCOUVER POLICE
 - ▲ WSU VANCOUVER CAMPUS POLICE
 - ▲ WASHOUGAL POLICE
 - ▲ CLARK COUNTY FIRE MARSHAL
 - ▲ WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
 - ▲ VANCOUVER CODE ENFORCEMENT
- ▼ FIRE/EMS AGENCIES
 - ▲ CAMAS FIRE DEPARTMENT
 - ▲ CLARK COUNTY FIRE & RESCUE
 - ▲ CLARK COUNTY FIRE DISTRICT #3
 - ▲ CLARK COUNTY FIRE DISTRICT #6
 - ▲ CLARK COUNTY FIRE DISTRICT #10
 - ▲ CLARK COUNTY FIRE DISTRICT #13



District #2's responsibilities for ambulance contract administration and Clark County's responsibility for uniform EMS regulation.

Homeland Security – Region IV

In 2002, Congress provided funding to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for the purpose of enhancing homeland security. As a result, DHS distributed grant funds to states to support regional emergency planning and preparedness. Washington State Emergency Management Division divided the state into nine regions. Clark, Cowlitz, Skamania, and Wahkiakum counties make up what is known as Washington State Homeland Security Region IV. In 2003, emergency management agencies within Region IV designated CRESA as the Region IV homeland security office to receive and administer grant funds.

- ▲ EAST COUNTY FIRE & RESCUE
- ▲ NORTH COUNTRY EMS
- ▲ VANCOUVER FIRE DEPARTMENT
- ▲ WASHOUGAL FIRE DEPARTMENT
- ▲ SKAMANIA COUNTY FIRE DISTRICT #6
- ▲ COWLITZ/SKAMANIA COUNTY FIRE DISTRICT #7
- ▲ AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE

Financial Management

In 2012, CRESA's expenditures exceeded \$11 million of which \$998,450 is related to the Homeland Security Grant. CRESA is audited annually by the Washington State Auditor's Office in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States and the standards applicable to financial audits contained in Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. CRESA has traditionally had clean audits, and we anticipate the same again for 2012.

REVENUE	2013
9-1-1 EXCISE TAX	\$4,100,000
USER FEES	\$5,709,492
OTHER REVENUE	\$279,396
	\$10,088,888

CRESA's five-member Financial Subcommittee consisting of financial representatives from Clark County, City of Vancouver, other cities in the County, Fire Districts within the County, and one CRESA staff member meets regularly to review CRESA's long-range Financial Plan, funding resources, equipment replacement, capital debt and ongoing operations. The subcommittee, in turn, submits their recommendations to the CRESA Administrative Board for consideration.

EXPENSES	
OPERATING EXPENSES	\$7,363,664

9-1-1 System

When a person dials 9-1-1, the call is sent to a computer which confirms the number of the caller and matches it to the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) responsible for that telephone number and address. The call is then selectively routed to the PSAP for the call taker to begin call processing.

Basic 9-1-1 systems provide dedicated lines for sending the caller to the correct answering point. Basic 9-1-1 systems were installed in the late 1960's and throughout the 1970 's. Industry experts consider this to be outdated technology, which has fallen out of favor in most areas of the country. However, there are still some Basic 9-1-1 systems in use in some areas, though not in Washington State.

Clark County does not have a non- emergency line for citizens to call instead of 9-1-1. This means all requests for police, emergency and non-emergency are still answered on the 9-1-1 lines.

Enhanced 9-1-1 (E9-1-1)

Enhanced 9-1-1 (E9-1-1) systems enhance Basic 9-1-1 by automatically providing the caller's telephone number and physical address. In an E9-1-1 system, the telephone number of the caller is referred to as the ANI (Automatic Number Identification); while the address is referred to as the ALI (Automatic Location Identification). ANI / ALI information will display on a screen associated with the telephone equipment.

The ANI/ALI benefits of E9-1-1 can greatly assist in providing a timely response to callers requiring emergency assistance. However, call takers must always confirm the ANI / ALI information and never assume the incident location is the same as the address on the screen.

Each call to 9-1-1 is identified by a class of service. This tells the call taker what type of phone the caller is using. Examples include – PBX, Coin, Cell, Residential and Business.

Wireless 9-1-1


In the 1980's cell phones were very expensive (around \$2000) and bolted into a car. By the 90's, cell phones had been approved for handheld use and cell phones began to be marketed. Their popularity increased and cell phone use in the United States exploded.¹

The popularity of cell phone use has created a critical issue for 9-1-1. The universe of events and places from which 9-1-1 calls can be placed is unlimited, as well as the chances of their being multiple calls from one location reporting the same incident. Accidental dials and lack of valid location information all have made wireless 9-1-1 one of the most significant, work altering developments for emergency communications.

Wireless E9-1-1 Phase I provides the phone number of the device calling 9-1-1 and the cell site or sector from which the call originated. When a wireless subscriber initiates a call to 9-1-1, the closest tower typically picks up the signal.



Wireless E9-1-1 Phase II requires the cell phone's call back number, the cell site or sector and the estimated location longitude and latitude.



Amount of wireless call to 9-1-1 as a portion of total 9-1-1 received

¹ APCO International Public Safety Telecommunication manual, Version 6, 2010

Wireless Challenges

Calls placed from wireless devices offer many challenges for 9-1-1, primarily because wireless devices are portable and therefore not associated with a permanent location. Wireless Phase I and II provide location assistance, however the location data is an estimated location and is not precise. The range of accuracy widely varies and call locations can be accurate from miles down to meters.

Additionally, when the wireless call is made to 9-1-1, the call is routed to the PSAP that is responsible for the tower from which the call is being made. This leads to misrouting of calls where differing jurisdictions meet.

The amount of time it takes to identify the correct location of wireless calls adds to the total triage time. As more and more people purchase cell phones the amount of 9-1-1 calls coming into the communications centers from wireless phones with only estimated locations increases and total time overall to handle incoming calls increase – even if the total number of calls into the center remains stable.

Dispatch Operations

Dispatchers are cross trained to do all jobs on the dispatch floor. These include 9-1-1 call taker, police dispatcher, fire & EMS dispatcher. Each “POD” on the floor has an assigned role and when a dispatcher works at that POD they are working in that assigned role.

Every position on the floor answers 9-1-1 calls as necessary. The call taking workload is distributed depending on the role the dispatcher is working at the time. Every attempt is made to keep primary law enforcement dispatchers off the 9-1-1 lines by having call takers and other dispatcher/call taker positions answer 9-1-1 lines first.

In the last few years we have been able to reduce the number of calls the VPD dispatcher has taken from between 3-8% of incoming 9-1-1 calls to 0.62% in 2012. However, as the number of wireless calls increase, our talk time increases and without additional resources to handle the additional workload we have concerns that the law enforcement dispatchers will end up answering more and more incoming 9-1-1 calls.

Minimum staffing varies depending on time of day from 6 people between 0300 and 0700 up to 10 during the busiest hours of the day.

Minimums include a Supervisor 24/7/365. As is the case with VPD, CRESA’s Dispatch Supervisors take incoming 9-1-1 calls to relieve the workload of the dispatchers. Any time this occurs it is time taken away from their supervisory functions.



CRESA Dispatch Floor

9-1-1 calls answered by the VPD dispatcher has decreased to 0.62% of the total call volume in 2012

Without the contribution of the Supervisors taking calls the basic 9-1-1 call taking function in CRESA would be faced with extremely high demand. Consequences include: longer ring time and increase in abandoned calls to 9-1-1 – either of which may mean we miss a call for help. Additionally, a dispatcher will spend a higher percentage of their time taking telephone calls. This increased demand for multi-tasking poses a significant risk for information overload, which can increase errors.

9-1-1 Call Triage


While each call that is taken is different, every call has the same characteristics. For example, compare a report of a burglary versus a traffic accident. Both incidents require a dispatcher to answer an incoming 911 line and find out where and what the situation is. Next the call must be prioritized, and a determination is made on what the response will be as well as what sort of information is necessary to complete the call and take the next incoming 911 call.

Determine Complaint – What is the service type needed? Is it provided by an agency we dispatch or a partner agency? What is the appropriate event type and sub type?

Determine Location – the location of the caller may be different than the location where the event occurred. Determining jurisdiction can be challenging. And as already mentioned identifying the location for wireless callers adds precious seconds to the length of each call.

Determine Response – based on the jurisdiction and the event type / sub type and any relevant exceptions, how does the responding agency want the call handled?

Route the Call – refer to appropriate agency, transfer to another communications center, initiate a new Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) event or update a call for service that was previously entered.



	CRESA Created Events	Dispatched Events	Cancelled & Referred Events	% of total VPD Events
2012	93,810	62,347	31,462	34%
2011	90,587	61,673	28,914	32%
2010	92,813	72,533	20,277	22%

CRESA already triages calls for service for all of our user agencies. For example, CRESA created 3879 traffic accident events in 2012. Of those 2,783 were dispatched to an officer. 28% of calls that were entered into the CAD system were cancelled or referred and no unit was assigned. These numbers do not include the many times dispatchers will simply refer the caller based on their knowledge of the jurisdictions policies and do not create a CAD event.

VPD Workload

When CRESA took over dispatching services from VPD in 1977, they had one dispatch net for a city with a population of 46,500. Today the VPD still has only one dispatch net to serve the 4th largest city in the State with a population of 163,200².


From 2002 to 2005, call processing times for Priority I Law calls increased 14 seconds. In addition, all other call priorities also increased. The average call processing time for Priority I law enforcement calls was 68 seconds in 2005. Today it is 105 seconds. This represents a 54% increase in call processing time from 2005, and a 94% increase from 2002.

There are also complaints of officers being unable to transmit on control 3 due to radio congestion. Adding a second dispatching net for VPD during the busiest hours of the day will improve response time to calls for service, reduce channel congestion, decrease dispatcher stress, and improve officer safety.

Workload for a dispatcher includes:

- ▲ NUMBER OF UNITS LOGGED IN
- ▲ RADIO TRANSMISSIONS
- ▲ CAD MESSAGES
- ▲ INCOMING PHONE CALLS – 9-1-1 AND BUSINESS LINES
- ▲ NUMBER OF EVENTS TO DISPATCH
- ▲ FIELD INITIATED EVENTS


Over the years CRESA has worked very hard to manage the continued growth of the VPD by adding a Data channel, adding an Operations channel, decrease call taking load, installed Mobile Data Computers and other technologies. However these measures can only help so much. In 2007, we received approval to hire 4 additional Full Time Employees (FTEs) so we could add an additional dispatcher for VPD 12 hours per day. Unfortunately that decision was rescinded, the positions were not funded by the VPD and had to be eliminated.



M	Unit	Location	Event Number	Unit Beat	Time	St	Event Ty	Subty	Info	Ty
*	2D12	2742 NE STAPLETON RD VAN		212	005	RA				PAT
*	2D13	WVP		213	017	RA				PAT
*	2D21			221	034	AM				PAT
*	2D22			222	054	AM				PAT
*	2D23			223	055	AM				PAT
*	2D24			224	060	AM				PAT
*	2X34			229	062	AM				SGT
*	2S31	VEP		231	007	BF				PAT
*	2D31			231	055	AM				PAT
*	2D32			232	029	AM				PAT
*	2S33	520 SE 155TH AV		233	008	AM				PAT
*	2D33			233	062	AM				PAT
*	2D42	EAST		242	059	RA				PAT
*	2D43	16200 SE MILL PLAIN BLVD VAN: @TARGET	13264595	243	008	AR	CO			PAT
*	2D44	15414 NE 9TH WAY VAN	13264602	244	061	AK	THR			PAT
*	2X30	VEP		249	429	AA				SGT
*	2X84			259	050	AM				CORP
*	2X83			259	053	AM				CORP
*	2X82	PAL MTG-ON CELL 772-2366		259	241	CA				CORP
*	2X81			259	060	AM				CORP
*	2T35			259	064	AM				TRAF
*	2T32			259	069	AM				TRAF
*	2T30			259	013	AM				TRAF
*	2T21	WVP/TRAFFIC		259	026	RU				TRAF
*	2H9			259	154	AM				K9
*	2H7	AVAILABLE/K9 TRAINING		259	025	TC				K9
*	2H6	WVP		259	066	TG				K9
*	2F43			269	619	AM				SRO
*	2F41	UHS		269	126	CA				SRO
*	2F22			269	821	AM				SRO
*	2F21	1601 E MCLOUGHLIN BLVD VAN: @HUDSONS BAY HIGH SCHL...	13264603	269	000	AR	CO			PST
*	2K73			279	236	AM				DET
*	2K58	2800 NE STAPLETON RD VAN: @VPD WVP		279	653	AU				DET
*	2K46			279	115	AM				DET
*	2K45			279	702	AM				DET
*	2P24			289	134	AV				DET

² As of April 2012 -City of Vancouver website: <http://www.cityofvancouver.us/cmo/page/facts-and-figures>


VPD Radio Channel Traffic for August



The VPD dispatch channel experienced a 4.8% increase from August of 2012 compared to August 2013.

In 2009 the Association for Public Safety Communications Officials did a study on dispatcher workload and employee retention. The survey participants (Directors) were asked “During critical events, at what point do dispatcher in your center struggle to effectively handle radio transaction?” The average response was 185 transmissions.

Daily VPD Radio Transmissions - August 2013



August 2013

In this figure, the red line indicates 185 transmissions. You can see the average for the entire month is below the threshold; however, there are a number of times throughout the month at various times of day that the transmissions spike well above that number. During these times, the VPD dispatcher is overloaded with radio traffic.

Dispatcher Workload based on CAD events

	Dispatched	Field Initiated	Field Created	Cancelled / Referred	Dispatch Workload
2012	62,347	26,530	8,937	31,462	93,810
2011	61,673	31,082	9,692	28,914	90,587
2010	72,533	33,439	5,208	20,277	92,813

Summary

CRESA is currently facing a number of challenges which we would like the task force to keep in mind as they contemplate the ICMA study and their recommendations to the City of Vancouver.

Wireless calls cause increase talk time and workload

No non-emergency number – all calls come into through the 9-1-1 system which burdens dispatchers with non-emergency calls

Next Generation 9-1-1 – in the near future text to 911 will be available. The average time to take a text call was 3 to 6 times longer when tested in Spokane, WA in 2012³

Workload – as recommendations are made to have an alternate response to incidents, please keep in mind how those calls could be received. Is there a way to get these non-emergency calls off the 9-1-1 system

Staffing / Training – It takes 18 to 24 months to fully train a new dispatcher. Even with an approval for additional staff to manage major changes to responses and other working conditions, it takes months before relief is available

CRESA was very involved in the VPD Differential Response planning group and while we have concerns about the impacts, we are willing to work together with VPD to address issues and questions as they come up, should that project move forward.

Looking forward, CRESA hopes to establish a non-emergency 911 number – and staff it with more call takers. CRESA hopes to address the officer safety issues on the VPD net by obtaining funding for additional dispatch resources.

As technologies change and improve we hope there may be alternate methods for reporting a variety of incidents to the appropriate agency without needing a CRESA dispatcher to provide the connection.

“Too often it takes catastrophic events to shed light on the urgent contributions public safety communications work makes to our nations wellbeing. During routine moments, public safety professionals labor well out of the public eye and, often, with limited resources and insufficient support”

³ Impacts of Next Generation 911 on Call Center Personnel, April 2012, Spokane 9-1-1



Chris Fisher, APCO International Past President

Thank you for the opportunity to present this information to your task force, and for your service to the community. 9-1-1 dispatchers truly are the invisible heroes and they need your consideration and assistance as you move forward with your project.