



1 and persistence. I am recognized as an oil spill expert by the International Maritime  
2 Organization (IMO), a United Nations specialized agency with responsibility for  
3 international shipping and prevention of marine pollution by ships, and the IMO has  
4 recommended me to lead multiple oil spill preparedness programs for several different  
5 sovereign governments. My CV is attached as Attachment A to my testimony.

6 4. I have more than 27 years of experience in preparing for and responding to  
7 major oil spills, with an emphasis on shoreline response. I have worked on more than a  
8 dozen oil spills, including the following: Exxon Valdez Alaska (1989 and follow-up  
9 through 2006), Barge 101 Alaska (1992), Greenhill blowout Louisiana (1992), New  
10 Carissa Oregon (1999), Transredes pipeline Bolivia (2000-2001), Johnson Creek Oregon  
11 (2004), SOTE Pipeline Ecuador (2004), Torm Mary Texas (2005), Barge PB20  
12 Washington (2005), Selendang Ayu Alaska (2004), Kab 121 Well Gulf of Mexico (2007),  
13 the Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico (2010-2014), Lemon Creek British Columbia  
14 (2014), and Poplar Pipeline Montana (2015). I have also been responsible for the  
15 preparation of more than 100 oil spill contingency plans for companies throughout the  
16 United States, Canada, Caribbean, South America, the Middle East, Africa, and Russia  
17 which describe in detail the procedures that would be used to control, contain, and recover  
18 oil if a spill were to occur. These oil spill contingency plans encompass the range from  
19 facility plans, to pipeline and shipping operations, to National Contingency Plans (NCP).  
20 My work with American Petroleum Institute (API), IOSC (International Oil Spill  
21 Conference), United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the IMO led to the development of  
22 an international guide and tools that are used for gauging oil spill preparedness and  
23 evaluating emergency response plans (*see* references and the ARPEL RETOSv2  
24 application).

25 **II. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS OF THE TERMINAL'S IMPACTS**

SWORN PRE-FILED TESTIMONY OF ELLIOTT TAYLOR - 2

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1           5.       I am familiar with the Vancouver Energy Terminal Project. I have  
2 personally reviewed materials submitted for the Application for Site Certification,  
3 Applicant Tesoro Savage Petroleum Terminal LLC, d/b/a Vancouver Energy's  
4 (hereinafter, TSPT or the Applicant) Preliminary Draft Environmental Impact Statement  
5 (PDEIS) and the Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council's Draft Environmental Impact  
6 Statement (DEIS). I also worked with a team of Tesoro, TSPT, and Primary Response  
7 Contractor (PRC) personnel on a two-day tabletop exercise in January 2016 analyzing the  
8 spill response actions typical of the first 24-48 hours for worst-case discharges from the  
9 facility. The tabletop exercise comprised two scenarios: a spill of Bakken crude and a spill  
10 of dilbit (Canadian oil sands product).

11           6.       In my work for the Applicant and for this testimony, specifically, I was  
12 asked to:

- 13           • Explain and evaluate the oil spill response planning requirements (federal and  
14 state) for the facility and associated transport systems (tank vessels and rail);
- 15           • Assess the fate and behavior for hypothetical spills of Bakken crude and dilbit  
16 with particular attention to the Columbia River; and
- 17           • Opine on the ability of the proposed response capabilities (TSPT, Tesoro,  
18 Mutual Aid, and Contracted PRCs) to mitigate hypothetical spill scenarios.

19           7.       In addition to my education, experience, and knowledge gained from my  
20 work in spill response planning and actual spill response in Washington and Oregon, I  
21 have considered the following materials in writing my declaration: PDEIS, DEIS, the  
22 Comments Letter re: DEIS, regulations (i.e., Code of Federal Regulations, the Washington  
23 Administrative Code), etc.

### 24 **III. ANALYSIS**

#### 25 **A. Regulatory Framework**

1           8.       While I have not quantified the probability of a spill event, in general, the  
2 likelihood of a major spill is low, given the control and prevention measures proposed and  
3 in place. Regardless of the low probability, oil spill contingency measures must be  
4 planned and in place to mitigate the potential effects of a release. The main applicable  
5 statutory and regulatory authorities governing spill response and spill prevention planning  
6 are codified in state and federal laws, including the following:

- 7           • Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA)
- 8           • Washington State Oil and Hazardous Substance Spills Act (1991)
- 9           • U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Oil Pollution Prevention  
10           (SPCC) and Spill Contingency Plan requirements, 40 C.F.R. Part 112 and  
11           Subpart D
- 11           • EPA's Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Contingency Planning  
12           Requirements – 40 C.F.R. § 265, Part D
- 12           • USCG Facility Response Plan requirements, 33 C.F.R. § 154
- 13           • Washington State Department of Ecology (WDOE) Oil Spill Prevention and  
14           Contingency Planning requirements – WAC 173-180 (Part F) and -182
- 14           • WDOE Safe and Effective Pre-booming Thresholds, WAC 173-180-224
- 15           • WDOE Pre-loading Transfer Plan, WAC 173-180-230
- 15           • USCG and WDOE Facility Operations and Transfer Manual, 33 C.F.R. § 156  
16           and WAC 173-180-400
- 16           • WDOE Oil Transfer Training and Certification program, WAC 173-180 Part E

17           9.       Congress enacted the federal OPA after the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989.  
18 The OPA strengthened the prevention, planning, response, and restoration efforts  
19 associated with oil spills. The OPA established liability for parties responsible for spills,  
20 set technical requirements for vessels that carry oil and for facilities that store or transport  
21 oil, and established an oil spill liability trust fund.

22           10.       The State of Washington adopted the Oil and Hazardous Substance Spills  
23 Act (OHSSA) in 1990, also in response to several major oil spills. OHSSA, as amended  
24 by the 1991 Oil Spill Prevention Act, requires plan holders to prepare for their worst case  
25 spill, as defined by the regulations, by conducting drills, pre-positioning equipment, and

1 training personnel. The statute directs WDOE to develop rules for setting minimum  
2 standards of compliance for facilities and vessel contingency plans, and for primary  
3 response contractors, in order to better prepare and respond to oil spills in Washington  
4 State.

5 11. As described in more detail, below, the federal OPA and the state OHSSA  
6 establish a system of tiered local and regional planning levels for oil spill prevention,  
7 mitigation, and response. Additionally, these statutes and accompanying regulations  
8 create planning and spill response requirements for individual facilities.

9 **i. Federal Planning Requirements and Structure**

10 12. The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan,  
11 40 C.F.R. Part 300, commonly referred to as the NCP identifies the national priorities for  
12 spill response and provides the general framework for efficient, coordinated, and effective  
13 spill response action. The EPA publishes the NCP in consultation with the National  
14 Response Team (NRT), which consists of 16 federal agencies with focus on various  
15 aspects of emergency response to pollution incidents. The NCP establishes a tiered  
16 system of regional and local contingency plans, under the direction of the Federal On-  
17 Scene Coordinator (FOOSC), including a Regional Contingency Plan (RCP) and Area  
18 Contingency Plans (ACP).

19 13. The RCP is modeled after the NCP and adds information specific to the  
20 region. Regional Response Teams (RRT) write the RCP. The RRT consists of designated  
21 representatives from key federal response and support agencies together with affected  
22 states.

23 14. ACPs provide response planning for sub-regional geographic areas. The  
24 NCP designates each Area and creates area committees which are comprised of personnel  
25 from federal and state agencies that coordinate response actions with tribal and local

1 governments and with the private sector. These area committees, under the coordinated  
2 direction of FOSCs, are responsible for developing ACPs. Area committees are also  
3 required to work with the response community to develop procedures to consider the use  
4 of alternative response measures.

5 15. ACPs provide detailed information on response procedures, priorities, and  
6 appropriate countermeasures by identifying response resources, cleanup strategies, and  
7 resources at risk within the area. These plans also identify appropriate spill response  
8 techniques (and appropriate conditions for their use), including: mechanical containment  
9 and recovery; dispersants and other chemical countermeasures; in-situ burning; shoreline  
10 cleanup; and natural removal.

11 16. Additionally, there are Local Emergency Response Plans that are part of  
12 the tiered response under the federal plan. Local emergency response plans are produced  
13 by Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs). LEPCs have membership from  
14 government agencies, including local fire, police, emergency managers, industry, citizens,  
15 and other interested parties. These plans guide local efforts in responding to spills.

16 17. In addition to these regional plans, the OPA requires vessel and facility  
17 owners that handle oil as cargo to develop detailed plans to immediately respond to an oil  
18 spill. At the federal level, these plans must be approved by the USCG and the EPA for  
19 marine transfer-related facilities such as the Vancouver Energy Terminal. In their plans,  
20 facility owners have to document their agreements with oil spill response organizations  
21 (OSROs), and be tested regularly. These plans are known as Facility Response Plans  
22 (FRPs). The graphic (right) depicts the organizational structure of the oil spill  
23 contingency and response plans in the United States.

24 **ii. State Requirements**

25

1           18.     In addition to the federal planning framework, Washington’s OHSSA, as  
2 amended and codified in RCW 90.56 and elsewhere, includes its own planning  
3 mechanism.

4           19.     It is my expert opinion that the State of Washington’s laws and regulations  
5 represent some of the most stringent requirements on spill prevention and response  
6 preparedness in the US and worldwide. The planning requirements defined in regulations  
7 for facilities, vessel, and rail (currently in public review) exceed response times and  
8 capabilities defined at the Federal level as well as for most states.

9           20.     The North West Area Contingency Plan (NWACP) has been adopted as the  
10 state’s Oil and Hazardous Substance Spill Prevention and Response Plan (or Statewide  
11 Master Plan) as required by statute (Chapter 90.56.060 RCW). The NWACP has been  
12 developed in consultation with multiple entities including the USCG, EPA, state agencies,  
13 local governments, tribal representatives, port districts, private facilities, environmental  
14 organizations, oil companies, shipping companies, containment and cleanup contractors,  
15 tow companies, and hazardous substance manufacturers. The NWACP identifies the  
16 responsibilities of state and local government, federal agencies, facility owners, and  
17 property owners whose land could be affected by a spill in the prevention, containment  
18 and cleanup of a worst case spill, and emergency response to the same. It also identifies  
19 actions necessary to reduce the likelihood of spills and establishes an incident command  
20 system for responding to oil and hazardous substances spill.

21           21.     Washington statute and regulations also require companies and vessels that  
22 handle or transport crude oil or refined oil products as cargo to have a government-  
23 approved contingency plan for preventing and responding to spills. This plan must be a  
24 written document that describes how the plan holder will respond to an oil spill, train its  
25 personnel, and what equipment they will have access to in case of a spill. WDOE focuses

1 on three major areas of these contingency plans: planning standards, a drill program, and  
2 primary response contractors.

3           22.     Planning standards are used to prepare for a worst case spill situation. The  
4 planning standards include requirements for oil spill assessment, boom, recovery, storage,  
5 in-situ burn, dispersants, shoreline cleanup, aerial observation, and workboats.  
6 Contingency plans are required to describe how the plan holder will meet the planning  
7 standards given its unique location, facility, and operations. To meet the planning  
8 standards, plan holders must use PRCs, who have been approved by the State. To become  
9 a State-approved PRC, a contractor must be able to provide 24-hour per day contact for  
10 spill response and commit to begin mobilization efforts within one hour from notification  
11 of a spill.

12           23.     Washington State's spill exercise, or drill, requirements are very similar to  
13 those found in the federal program. WDOE evaluates all drills and provides the plan  
14 holder with feedback on areas where its contingency plan is inadequate. In addition,  
15 WDOE shares lessons learned with all plan holders in the state and provides input to plan  
16 holders while they develop or update their plans.

17                   **iii.     Implementation of Federal and State Planning Requirements in**  
18                   **Vancouver, WA and Along the Columbia River**

19           24.     In the Northwest Area (defined as the coastal and inland zones of Idaho,  
20 Oregon, and Washington), the RRT and Area Planning Committee have joined together to  
21 accomplish all planning and preparedness activities and jointly publish the NWACP. The  
22 NWACP also incorporates the Statewide Master Plan required by the state's OHSSA. The  
23 NWACP undergoes regular review and updates. The 2016 version is available at:  
24 <http://www.rrt10nwac.com/nwacp/>.

25

1           25.     In addition to the main volume, the NWACP is made up of Geographic  
2 Response Plans (GRPs). GRPs are the strategic and tactical volumes of the NWACP and  
3 are site-specific plans for responding to oil spills in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. The  
4 plans are tailored to a specific beach, shore, or water way. Each GRP has two primary  
5 objectives, which are to: pre-identify sensitive natural, cultural or significant economic  
6 resources; and give responders directions by prioritizing response strategies. The GRPs  
7 are developed to identify sensitive areas and resources in a geographic region that would  
8 be at risk from a spill in the area and the recommended strategies and tactics to mitigate  
9 impacts on those sensitive areas and resources if threatened by a spill. Facility or vessel  
10 response plans are required to address spill response priorities and protection strategies for  
11 a spill originating at their respective locations.

12           26.     Given that Facility Response Plans (FRP) or Vessel Response Plans (VRP)  
13 must work in context of Area Plans, the GRPs are thus an integral part of the VRPs and  
14 FRPs. The strategies identified in a GRP serve as guidelines for responsible parties,  
15 federal and state agencies' coordinated efforts and are deployed during an oil spill. Each  
16 GRP has several chapters with a variety of information that is useful to responders, both in  
17 the initial hours and for longer periods of time if a response is sustained. Responders  
18 implement the directions listed in the GRP without delay while the responders also act to  
19 contain the oil and recovery it off the surface of the water. Over time, the GRP protection  
20 strategies are refined and supplemented based on field assessments and actual  
21 deployments (as part of spill response or exercises). The GRPs are available at:  
22 [https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/coastalatlasc/storymaps/spills/spills\\_sm.html](https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/coastalatlasc/storymaps/spills/spills_sm.html).

23                   **iv.     Inspections**

24           27.     In addition to meeting regulatory compliance for spill prevention and  
25 response, the Vancouver Energy Terminal would be subject to regular inspections from

1 federal and state agencies. The USCG, WDOE, and EPA each have the prerogative to visit  
2 and inspect the facility for compliance with regulatory matters. Furthermore, the Terminal  
3 will have its own inspection program, including inspections by external organizations. A  
4 summary of inspections is attached hereto as Attachment B.

5 **B. Oil Types and Characteristics**

6 28. In the United States, the EPA and USCG divide petroleum-based oils into  
7 five groups. *See Attachment C*.

8 29. The two major types of crude oil being considered for the Terminal are  
9 Bakken crude and crude oil products from the Canadian oil sands region. The Canadian  
10 Oil Sands Products (OSPs) include diluted bitumen products, or dilbits, such as Access  
11 Western Blend (AWB) and Cold Lake Blend (CLB) and light synthetic crude oils  
12 (synbits). The properties of these crude oils and comparison to other petroleum oils, and  
13 their likely fate and behavior relevant to the Vancouver Energy Terminal Project, are  
14 attached hereto as Attachment D.

15 30. Group 1 (non-persistent oils and refined products such as gasoline) tend to  
16 dissipate completely through evaporation within a few hours and do not normally form  
17 emulsions. Group 2 oils (such as Bakken crude) can lose up to 40% by volume through  
18 evaporation and some may form unstable to stable emulsions. Group 3 oils tend to lose  
19 less through evaporation and can form viscous emulsions. Group 4 oils (such as IFO 180  
20 or Bunker B) are very persistent due to the minimal content of volatile hydrocarbons and  
21 their high viscosity, which preclude both evaporation and dispersion. Group 5 is meant to  
22 collectively classify oils with a density greater than that of freshwater.

23 31. Fate and transport are two phenomena that modify the properties and  
24 location of spilled oil, respectively. Many treatises are available that discuss the natural  
25 transport processes for spilled oil, generally associated with currents, turbulence, winds,

1 and gravity (NRC, IPIECA, API, ITOPF)<sup>1</sup>. Once oil is spilled and exposed to the  
2 elements, it undergoes continuous compositional changes associated with weathering.  
3 Groups 2 through 5 oils can become denser as light-end hydrocarbons evaporate, and can  
4 potentially shift in behavior to a higher group. A spill to water will spread on the water  
5 surface and can be transported by currents as it continues to spread and fragment. Spills to  
6 land also will spread and move down slope, but the process is much slower compared to  
7 what happens in water. These transport processes are discussed in the DEIS, Ex-0051-  
8 PCE (DEIS, Chapter 4), and PDEIS, Ex-0004-PCE, (PDEIS, Appendices D and H of Oil  
9 Spill Contingency Plan).

10 32. As noted in the NW Area Planning Task Force 2014 report “Emerging  
11 Risks”:

12 [T]he characteristics of OSP, Oil Sands Products, and Bakken  
13 crude are well understood and fall within parameters that are  
14 currently addressed within the NWACP. While OSP does not  
15 pose any “new” spill threat, the focus on OSP has increased  
16 recognition that current fate and effects predictive modeling does  
17 not adequately address all aspects of the heavier Group 4 oils and  
18 more work in this area is warranted.

19 33. Similarly, extensive work has been done to understand natural oil  
20 weathering processes, such as evaporation, dissolution, water uptake or emulsification,  
21 and consequent oil properties changes (e.g., Fingas, 2011; NRC, 2003)<sup>2</sup>. Together,  
22 transport and weathering result in ultimate fate of spilled oil, whether that is as vapors to  
23 the atmosphere (evaporation), stranded on river banks, degraded to asphalts (such as

24 <sup>1</sup> National Research Council, (NRC) 2003, Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates and Effects; IPIECA/IOGP,  
25 2015. Oil spills: inland response. IOGP Report 514, 36p.; IPIECA/OGP, 2015. Contingency planning for oil  
spills on water. OGP Report 519, 60p.; API 2015, Fact Sheet 3, Fate of Oil and Weathering (Oil Spill  
Prevention); ITOPF (Accessed May 2016) [http://www.itopf.com/knowledge-resources/documents-  
guides/fate-of-oil-spills/weathering/](http://www.itopf.com/knowledge-resources/documents-guides/fate-of-oil-spills/weathering/)

<sup>2</sup> Fingas, M., 2011. Oil Spill Science and Technology; National Research Council (NRC) 2003, Oil in the  
Sea III: Inputs, Fates and Effects

1 through photo-oxidation), or biodegraded to simple compounds. Many of these are  
2 described in the application and are modeled through trajectory and weathering models  
3 (ex., the National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration's (NOAA) GNOME and  
4 ADIOS2). More complex use of these or other models, not used for the DEIS, are those  
5 that combine these natural phenomena with assumed oil spill response countermeasures  
6 that can be expected to limit movement and modify variables in the weathering models.

7         34. Weathering processes include evaporation, dissolution, emulsification,  
8 sedimentation, microbial degradation, and photo-oxidation. Weathering changes the oil's  
9 physical and chemical properties. Fresh oil is more volatile, contains more water-soluble  
10 components, floats, is not very viscous, and more readily disperses from the source.  
11 Weathered oil initially loses volatile components, which are also the most water-soluble  
12 components, and the oil becomes more viscous and more likely to form more coherent  
13 slicks as opposed to spreading out in a thin film. Over time, weathering continues to  
14 change the composition of oil until it degrades in the environment, leaving behind only  
15 small quantities of residue (e.g., tar balls). Some of the oil (especially heavier oil) may  
16 mix with water and emulsify. Emulsions can be unstable (break down naturally and  
17 quickly once agitation or mixing ceases) to stable. Stable emulsions are more resistant to  
18 rapid weathering and more difficult to collect or treat relative to non-emulsified oil.

19         35. Although low probability, a spill from the facility or rail line is more likely  
20 to occur on land where typically oil will move slowly, without the aid of wind or water  
21 currents. A spill on land will migrate downslope and, depending on oil viscosity and soil  
22 permeability, a portion may infiltrate into the ground. For oil reaching a river or wetland,  
23 a portion of that oil can be expected to strand on the shoreline or bank and some may  
24 infiltrate into sediments, depending on oil volume and viscosity and sediment grain sizes  
25 (pore space). In addition to the limiting factor of pore space, presence of ground water and

1 even water saturated soils tables will limit oil penetration. Where exposed, sunlight may  
2 photo-oxidize stranded oil as well as biological degradation.

3 36. The DEIS indicates that on sandy beaches oil can penetrate up to two  
4 meters (Mosbech 2002). In the Mosbech citation, there is no scientific evidence presented  
5 regarding this depth of penetration or the types of oils considered. Crude oils generally do  
6 not penetrate deeply into fine sediments. Very light oils, such as a Bakken crude, are able  
7 to penetrate meters in sand and coarser sediments given their low viscosity when fresh. As  
8 the crude oil weathers the viscosity of the residue increases and therefore is not able to  
9 penetrate into pore spaces as easily. Other conventional crude oils and dilbits have  
10 initially higher viscosities and will penetrate less into sands and coarser sediment  
11 compared to a Bakken crude. For medium crude oils, penetration into sand is usually on  
12 the order of centimeters.

13 **i. Fate and Behavior of Bakken Crudes**

14 37. Bakken crude oils are very light and relatively volatile crudes, classed as a  
15 Group 2 oil. Bulk properties of Bakken crudes fall into conventional light crudes (API  
16 gravity between 37 to 46) (Attachment C). A specific concern with Bakken crude is the  
17 flammability of the unweathered crude and associated air hazards. Air monitoring and  
18 sampling during a study conducted with a controlled release of Bakken crude at Ohmsett  
19 (2014)<sup>3</sup> showed:

- 20 • No Lower Explosive Limit exceedances above 10%. A maximum of 4.7% was  
21 observed at the location of release after 4 minutes.
- 22 • Hydrogen sulfide was detected at a maximum concentration of 0.2 ppm. One  
23 minute averages were normally below 0.04 ppm.
- 24 • Maximum verifiable Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) concentration of 138  
25 ppm (west side of tank located within 5 feet of study area). The highest

25 <sup>3</sup> EPA, Bakken Shale Crude Oil Spill Evaluation Pilot Study (April 2015)

1 verifiable one minute average was 67 ppm. Both were recorded within 5  
2 minutes of the release.

- 3 • A maximum benzene concentration of 5500 ppbv was detected using an
- 4 UltraRAE located 5 feet above the release point, during the release.
- 5 • A maximum benzene concentration of 2700 ppbv was detected in a Tedlar bag
- 6 sample collected 5 feet above the release point, during the release.
- 7 • Charcoal tube results suggested a possible maximum concentration for an 8
- 8 hour TWA of 75.1 ppbv benzene.
- 9 • The Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer detected a maximum benzene
- 10 concentration of 550 ppbv in downwind locations.
- 11 • About six hours after the initial release, verifiable VOC readings (1-minute
- 12 average) were all below 5 ppm.

13 38. A significant portion of Bakken oil will naturally evaporate when exposed  
14 to air. If reaching water, spreading will be relatively fast relative to most other crudes and  
15 a portion of the hydrocarbon can be expected to dissolve into the water column. A portion  
16 also may naturally disperse into the water column provided mixing energy or turbulence.  
17 The fast spreading means that it may be challenging to boom if it has spread but then  
18 dissipation of product on water progresses faster through the natural weathering process.  
19 An example of how quickly Bakken crude naturally dissipates is provided by a couple of  
20 case studies.

21 39. A spill of 750-800 bbls of Bakken crude into the Mississippi River from a  
22 barge in February 2014 showed the oil spread quickly to form a light, milky sheen<sup>4</sup>.  
23 Pockets of oil were trapped within a barge fleet downstream and cleanup was limited to  
24 the immediate vicinity of the spill site and decontamination around the barge fleet. The  
25 total oil recovered was 2.3 bbl illustrating how quickly this light crude oil naturally

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<sup>4</sup> NOAA presentation by Gulf of Mexico SSCs, February 2014. Bakken Crude Oil Spill, Barge E2MS 303,  
Lower Mississippi River,  
[http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/RRT3.nsf/Resources/May2014\\_pdf/\\$File/Bakken\\_Crude\\_Spill\\_E2MS303\\_Revised.pdf](http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/RRT3.nsf/Resources/May2014_pdf/$File/Bakken_Crude_Spill_E2MS303_Revised.pdf) (accessed April 2016)

1 dissipates. The spill resulted in closure of the river for 65 miles downstream for 2 days.  
2 No fish kills or oiled wildlife were reported.

3 40. In the case of the 2015 Poplar Pipeline release into the Yellowstone River,  
4 dissolved and dispersed Bakken oil reached a water intake 14 feet below surface, forcing  
5 the intake and treatment plant to shut down. Spill responders evacuated remaining oil in  
6 the pipeline between valves and recovered oil trapped under the ice immediately over the  
7 location of the pipeline crossing. Non-recoverable sheens were identified to a maximum  
8 downstream distance of 73 miles in the first few days following the release. As in the  
9 Mississippi spill case, natural evaporation and dispersion accounted for most of the light  
10 crude oil loss. No oiled wildlife impacts were observed or reported.

11 41. EPA water sampling during the Poplar Pipeline response showed<sup>5</sup>:

- 12 • The ice cover appears to have prevented the light, volatile components from  
13 evaporating, and provided the right conditions for benzene and other VOCs to  
14 dissolve into the water instead.
- 15 • Initial water sample results collected 2 days post-release showed that dissolved  
16 concentrations of benzene in the public water supply exceeded the drinking  
17 water standard of 5 parts per billion.
- 18 • Within one week of the initial release( 23 January), MT DEQ confirmed the  
19 municipal water delivery system met the federal Safe Drinking Water Act  
20 standards
- 21 • Water sampling data from 5 and 10 days post-initial release (22 January and 27  
22 January), at the water treatment detected toluene but only at the lower  
23 quantitative capability of the instrument (therefore reported as an estimated  
24 value); between 27 January and 23 February BTEX results were not detectable.
- 25 • On 14 March 2015, the ice on the Yellowstone River upstream of the spill site  
began to break at a very rapid rate. At that time the city shut down its water  
intake. VOC levels jumped from non-detect up to >200 ppb over the course of  
the day. By 17 March VOCs were at normal levels and normal operations were  
resumed for drinking water intake.

<sup>5</sup> EPA Region 8, Pollution Report #12 (FINAL), available at  
[https://www.epaos.org/site/sitrep\\_profile.aspx?site\\_id=9708&counter=23045](https://www.epaos.org/site/sitrep_profile.aspx?site_id=9708&counter=23045); Bridger Pipeline Release,  
Water Treatment Plant Analytical Data Summary (Feb. 2015),  
<https://www.epaos.org/sites/9708/files/WTP%20Analytical%20Summary%2002-24-15.pdf>.

1           42.     Given the low viscosity of Bakken crude, a spill may penetrate into and  
2 migrate through sand, mixed sediment, or boulder/riprap bank materials but is not retained  
3 effectively by the open pore space. On impermeable or clay surfaces, Bakken crude will  
4 simply spread. In porous materials, the crude would infiltrate and spread until reaching  
5 relatively impermeable soils or water, where it may continue to spread, diffuse, and  
6 undergo gradual degradation.

7           43.     The lessons learned from research and spills reveal that Bakken crude oils  
8 quickly dissipate in flowing water but can be expected to persist longer if it infiltrates into  
9 soils. The rapid loss of volatile light ends in the first hours of a response presents safety  
10 concerns where oil is concentrated so that controls must be put in place to protect  
11 personnel from inhalation risks and to avoid accidental fire and explosion. As a very light  
12 crude oil, Bakken crude has a much shorter half-life in the environment relative to most  
13 other crude oils and its fate and behavior is similar to other Group 2 oils that have been  
14 transported and in use for many years.

15                   **ii.     Fate and Behavior of Oil Sands Crudes**

16           44.     A major concern expressed with oil sands crude products is the inference  
17 that these OSPs are bitumen. Although these products are created from bitumen, the crude  
18 oil products such as dilbit are quite different from the raw bitumen. The generalized use of  
19 the term “bitumen” in place of the actual oil sand products is misleading as the properties  
20 and behavior of a raw bitumen are not the same as the for OSPs. For example, sections  
21 4.5.3, 4.5.4, and 4.5.5 of the DEIS mischaracterize the densities of oil that the facility will  
22 handle because it improperly characterizes some oil types as “heavy” without reference to  
23 their actual density. That error is problematic for two reasons. First, these sections  
24 analyze impacts of oils the project does not propose receiving. The project does not  
25 propose receiving oil with a density of 1.01 g/cm<sup>3</sup>. Therefore, the analysis in this section

1 of the DEIS improperly considers oils of that density, and their impacts. The DEIS  
2 indicates that heavy oils have a density of 1.01 g/cm<sup>3</sup> and sink, and then draws  
3 conclusions regarding project impacts based on oils of that density with an assumption  
4 that those oils sink. However, the Terminal products all have a density of <1 g/cm<sup>3</sup> and  
5 therefore will not sink unless other processes are invoked.

6 45. The natural evaporation of light end hydrocarbons from a dilbit will lead to  
7 a heavier (denser) residue; however, it is important to note that experiments done on  
8 natural weathering show there is no phase separation of diluent and bitumen but instead  
9 the homogeneous blend has properties unique to the oil blend itself. The fresh and  
10 evaporated oils remained as homogeneous mixtures of soluble components. Meso-scale  
11 experiments conducted on natural weathering of OSPs in tanks and flumes showed that of  
12 the dilbits tested, most did not reach densities exceeding that of freshwater and none  
13 exceeded that of normal seawater (*see Attachment E*). The tank and flume experiment  
14 results show natural evaporation for two of the major export dilbits, AWB and CLB, in  
15 comparison to freshwater (1 g/cm<sup>3</sup>) and seawater (1.03 g/cm<sup>3</sup>) densities. AWB and CLB  
16 (under moderate agitation) approached freshwater density after approximately six days of  
17 weathering (SLRoss, 2012; WPW, 2013; King et al 2014)<sup>6</sup>, further supporting the case  
18 that the crude oils proposed for handling at Terminal will not sink if spilled into water.

19 46. The Terminal oils have API of 15–45. Many oils with an API less than  
20 22.3 API may be classified as “heavy” because of their density—but unless their API is

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 <sup>6</sup> Witt O’Briens; Polaris Applied Sciences; Western Canada Marine Response Corporation, A Study of  
23 Fate and Behavior of Diluted Bitumen oils on Marine waters; Dilbit Experiments – Gainford, Alberta;  
24 Transmountain Pipeline ULC: 2013; p. 163.

25 King, T.L.; Robinson, B.; Boufadel, M.; and Lee, K. , 2014. Flume tank studies to elucidate the fate and  
behavior of diluted bitumen spilled at sea. Marine Pollution Bulletin 2014 83 (1). p32-37  
SL Ross Environmental Research Limited. Meso-scale Weathering of Cold Lake Bitumen/Condensate  
Blend; Ottawa, Canada, 2012 Report prepared for Enbridge Northern Gateway. Filed with the National  
Energy Board, February 6, 2013

1 equal to or less than 10, they do not sink in fresh water without invoking some other  
2 processes. Under appropriate conditions, floating oil may become fragmented and  
3 undergo vertical mixing and dispersion. Given sufficient energy and suspended  
4 particulates, the dispersed oil droplets may interact with suspended fine sediments (fines).  
5 The combined oil and sediment or organic matter, often referred to as OMA or OPA (oil  
6 mineral aggregates/oil particulate aggregates), may remain suspended in the water column  
7 or settle to the river bed depending on the aggregate density, water density, and local  
8 turbulence.

9         47. Effective OPA formation works best when sufficient energy is available to  
10 form small oil droplets; however, the more viscous nature of dilbit resists natural  
11 dispersion and the oil tends to break into fragments rather than disperse. Recent tests  
12 showed that dilbit-derived OMA was not readily identifiable in wave tank tests at various  
13 sediment concentrations and that non-“chemically” dispersed dilbit resists sinking<sup>7</sup>.

14         48. The DEIS statement oversimplifies the OPA process and thereby  
15 drastically overestimates the amount of oil that would sink, and thus the impacts of the  
16 sunken or submerged oil. While oil weathering combined with suspended sediment  
17 interaction can lead to a portion of dilbit oil becoming submerged or sunken in the case of  
18 a spill, most oil will still float. In the case of the Kalamazoo River spill, a worst-case  
19 actual spill of dilbit into fresh water, most of the dilbit was recovered from the water  
20 surface. An estimated 15-18% of the spilled oil that entered the Kalamazoo River ended  
21 up attached to bottom sediments, of which a significant portion was released through  
22 agitation (poling, sparging) (Enbridge, 2013<sup>8</sup>; Dollhopf et al, 2014<sup>9</sup>).

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
24 <sup>7</sup> Laughlin, C., Law, B., Zions, V., King, T., Robinson, B., and Wu, Y., 2016. The dynamics of diluted  
25 bitumen derived oil-mineral aggregates, Part 1. Canadian Technical Report of Fisheries and Aquatics  
Sciences.

<sup>8</sup> Enbridge, 2013. Enbridge Line 6B Response,

1           49.     In a review of OPA formation mechanisms, lab studies, the Kalamazoo  
2 case, and conditions prevalent in the Fraser River, researchers conclude that OPA  
3 formation is unlikely under most conditions characteristic of the lower Fraser River given  
4 that suspended sediment concentrations and energy levels of the study area are less than  
5 those in which OPA is observed to happen (Hospital et al., 2016)<sup>10</sup>. The same is expected  
6 to be true for the Columbia River, which tends to carry less sediment than the Fraser  
7 River. For cases of spills into flood plains in which sediment/organic matter interaction  
8 can be expected to be higher than within the river channel, or at contact points with  
9 shorelines, OPA formation may be a more significant process in terms of oil fate than  
10 conditions such as in the Columbia River.

11           50.     In addition, the DEIS applies the same analysis to dense oils' capacity to  
12 sink with no acknowledgement or reference to the fact that water bodies have variable  
13 density. For example, estuaries have higher water density than freshwater riverine water;  
14 as a result, dense oils must be heavier in order to sink in an estuary environment compared  
15 to a riverine setting. Over the course of a 10-day weathering study of two dilbit products  
16 (AWB and CLB), no sinking was observed for oils exposed to various wind and wave  
17 conditions in estuarine water with salinities of approximately 15 ppt or in flume studies  
18  
19  
20

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<http://response.enbridgeus.com/response/main.aspx?id=12783> (accessed Sept. 2013)

21 <sup>9</sup> Dollhopf, R. J.; Fitzpatrick, F. A.; Kimble, J. W.; Capone, D. M.; Graan, T. P.; Zelt, R. B.; Johnson, R.,  
22 2014. Response to Heavy, Non-Floating Oil Spilled in a Great Lakes River Environment: A Multiple-Lines-  
23 Of-Evidence Approach for Submerged Oil Assessment and Recovery. In Proceedings of the International  
24 Oil Spill Conference Proceeding, Savannah, GA, 2014 pp. 434-448

25 <sup>10</sup> Hospital, Aurelien et al. Tetra Tech EBA, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.,2016. Stochastic Spill  
Modeling in Support of the Ecological Risk Assessment (ERA) of Hypothetical Pipeline Diluted Bitumen  
Spills in the Lower Fraser River as Part of the Trans Mountain Expansion Project, Proceedings of the 39th  
AMOP Technical Seminar on Environmental Contamination and Response, June 7-9 2016, Halifax Nova  
Scotia

1 with seawater at 35 ppt (CRREL and SLRoss 2015; King et al 2014; SLRoss, 2012;  
2 Taylor et al., 2014; WPW 2013)<sup>11</sup>.

3 51. A spill of dilbits to land or in contact with the river banks or shorelines  
4 would have very limited penetration into sand but could penetrate into pebble and coarser  
5 materials (Harper 2015; CRREL and SLRoss 2015)<sup>12</sup>. Retention would be expected to be  
6 greater for dilbit than Bakken should it penetrate into coarse riverbanks. Coastal and  
7 Ocean Resources (2013)<sup>13</sup> estimated dilbit penetration and retention on different  
8 substrates, assuming that weathered dilbit will: (1) have <1 cm of penetration in sands, < 5  
9 cm in pebbles, and < 10 cm in cobbles (Harper & Kory (1995)); (2) retention of 300 L/m<sup>3</sup>  
10 for sand, 200 L/m<sup>3</sup> for pebble and 100 L/m<sup>3</sup> for cobbles (Harper & Kory (1995)); and (3) a  
11 layer of weathered oil above the sediments of 1 cm for rock, sand, pebbles and cobbles.  
12 These assumptions for a weathered dilbit are derived from extrapolating the Bunker C  
13 results, which may reasonably reflect weathered dilbit behavior but are not representative  
14 of fresh dilbit. CRREL and SLRoss (2015) found oils sands products penetrated to  
15 approximately 18 – 20 cm in gravel, but less than 10cm in sand, and only a few  
16 centimeters into mixed soil.

17 52. Extensive ongoing and recent research and the limited experience from  
18 OSP spills reveal that dilbit properties are likely to change quickly during the first days  
19 should a spill occur. Similar to many medium to light crudes, the rapid loss of volatile  
20

21 <sup>11</sup> CRREL/SLRoss, 2015. Investigation of the Behaviour of Diluted Bitumen and Heavy Conventional  
22 Crude Oil Spills. Final Report prepared for the American Petroleum Institute. 125pp plus appendices.

23 Taylor, E., Challenger, G., Rios, J., Morris, J., McCarthy, M.W., and C. Brown. 2014. Dilbit Crude Oil  
24 Weathering on Brackish Water: Meso-scale Tests of Behavior and Spill Countermeasures. Proceedings of  
25 the Thirty-Seventh AMOP Technical Seminar. Environment Canada, pp. 317 – 337

<sup>12</sup> Harper, John et al., Coastal Ocean and Resources, Sidney, British Columbia, Canada. Retention and  
Penetration of Diluted Bitumen Products in Coastal Sediments. Proceedings of the 39th AMOP Technical  
Seminar on Environmental Contamination and Response, June 7-9 2016, Halifax Nova Scotia;

<sup>13</sup> Coastal and Ocean Resources, 2013. Procedures for Estimating Oil Retention in Spill Modeling. Report  
prepared for Trans Mountain Pipeline

1 light ends in the first hours of a response presents safety concerns where oil is  
2 concentrated so that controls must be put in place to protect personnel from inhalation  
3 risks and to avoid accidental fire and explosion. Relative to Bakken crude, dilbits have a  
4 longer half-life in the environment; however, the concern of sinking dilbit is seriously  
5 overstated as multiple lines of evidence show that most, if not all dilbit, will remain  
6 floating on water for days or longer.

7 **iii. Trajectory and Mass Balance Analysis**

8 a. Oil Movement and Trajectory

9 53. The trajectory analysis in the DEIS was completed based on a 48-hour  
10 worst-case spill condition<sup>14</sup>. The results of the analysis indicate that the geographic area of  
11 potential impact from an incident originating in Vancouver, Washington, within 48 hours  
12 of release is the Lower Columbia River from RM 105 (45°38'4.19"N, 122°42'10.55"W)  
13 to RM 47 (46° 8'40.52"N, 123°17'46.39"W), or approximately 58 river miles  
14 downstream from the terminal. In accordance with the requirements of WAC 173-182,  
15 and WAC 173-182-315 in particular, the worst-case discharge scenario is an unabated  
16 release over 48 hours of all the volume of oil in the largest tank on shore and it does not  
17 take into consideration any source control measures, which would be among the normal  
18 first steps in a spill situation, or containment (un-emptied tank, secondary containment).  
19 The trajectory also does not take into account any additional response containment or  
20 downstream boom operations that may divert oil to river bank collection points.

21 54. In the unlikely event of a spill that originates from a tank vessel or rail car  
22 into the Columbia River or offshore, currents and winds combined with natural spreading  
23 would transport oil generally down current. Current speeds vary depending on the river  
24 discharge and cross section, upstream or downstream winds, and tides at least upstream to

25 <sup>14</sup> DEIS, App. D.4; id., App. H.



1           57. ADIOS modeling results show volume losses, primarily through  
2 evaporation, and changes in viscosity and density of the remaining oil (attached hereto as  
3 Attachment F). The most significant weathering changes for both crude oil types in the  
4 first 24 hours are similar to many other crude oils. More than 33% of the Bakken crude  
5 has evaporated compared to 24% for the CLB dilbit. In that first day, densities reach 890  
6 (Bakken) and 979 Mg/m<sup>3</sup> (CLB), both of which would remain floating on the fresh water  
7 unless entrained through turbulence. If and where entrained, the oil would tend to  
8 resurface through natural buoyancy. Oil viscosity, which is a key factor for oil spreading  
9 and for skimmer and pump operations, increases minimally to 33 cSt in the first 24 hours  
10 for Bakken crude whereas a much more pronounced increase to over 3000 cSt occurs for  
11 dilbit.

12           58. Context for the general behaviors of Bakken and dilbit crudes are  
13 compared relative to common major oil types in Attachment G (modified from Polaris  
14 2013<sup>16</sup>). Both crude oil types fall within the range of existing oil groups. The fate,  
15 behavior, effects, and countermeasures of these two oil types are all encompassed within  
16 the broad understanding and experience of oil spill response preparedness.

17           **C. Oil Spill Response Capabilities**

18           59. Conservative emergency and spill contingency planning will address the  
19 range of products that may be handled at the Terminal. The potentially higher content of  
20 lighter, volatile components in Bakken crude are not significantly different from handling  
21 other light crude oils or jet fuel. Similarly, handling a potentially heavier crude oil, such as  
22 OSPs, would entail countermeasures typically used and required for response to some ship  
23 bunker fuels, such as an IFO 180. Effective spill response countermeasures and controls

24 <sup>16</sup> Polaris Applied Sciences, Inc., 2013. A Comparison of the Properties of Diluted Bitumen Crudes with  
25 other Oils (accessed June 2014)  
[http://www.crrc.unh.edu/sites/crrc.unh.edu/files/comparison\\_bitumen\\_other\\_oils\\_polaris\\_2014.pdf](http://www.crrc.unh.edu/sites/crrc.unh.edu/files/comparison_bitumen_other_oils_polaris_2014.pdf)

1 have one key objective: to minimize impacts related to the spill and the response. The  
2 fundamental strategies for achieving this objective are to limit spreading of the spill so  
3 that the footprint is minimized and to protect priority sensitive areas. These two  
4 fundamental strategies are effectively represented by the GRPs. The DEIS did not  
5 consider the spill response strategies in the GRPs that are activated in the event of a spill.  
6 These strategies include booming to contain oil and protect specific sensitive resources,  
7 and cleanup measures to recover oil and treat river banks.

8           60. A major response consideration for both oil types is the safety and health  
9 risks associated with evaporation of hydrocarbon light ends from a spill. As noted in  
10 Hayward et al. (2016)<sup>17</sup>:

11                         Response to spills of these crude oils involves two weathering  
12                         timeframes: the initial flammability phase when light ends of the  
13                         oils are present and fires could occur, during which the deployment  
14                         of traditional spill response options would be pre-empted by first  
15                         responder (fire fighter) actions; and the second, longer-term phase  
16                         of responding to the oil on-water. For purposes of this CERA,  
17                         pollution responders could become actively engaged in the initial  
18                         4–6 h after first responders (e.g., fire fighters) would have arrived  
19                         on scene and might still be dealing with flammability risks. Recent  
20                         incidents have resulted in significant fires involving Bakken oil,  
21                         which has been known to re-ignite. Flammability is also a concern  
22                         with freshly-spilled dilbit oil. During this emergency phase, public  
23                         safety actions would take precedence over pollution response  
24                         actions. The behavior of the oil will begin to change due to  
25                         weathering after the initial 4–6 h.

**i. Spill Response Capabilities and Equipment Needed for Bakken Crude**

22           61. The primary concern for handling and addressing a spill of Bakken crude is  
23 the high volatility of the crude oil with respect to most other crudes. The range of its

24 <sup>17</sup> Hayward Walker, A., Stern, C., Scholz, D., Nielsen, E., Csulak, F. and Gaudiosi, R. 2016. Consensus  
25 Ecological Risk Assessment of Potential Transportation-related Bakken and Dilbit Crude Oil Spills in the  
Delaware Bay Watershed, USA. J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2016, 4, 23

1 physical and chemical properties would need to be characterized such that appropriate  
2 spill response countermeasures and safety considerations can be integrated into the spill  
3 response strategies. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration  
4 (PHMSA) and Federal Railroad Administration issued a supplementary safety advisory,  
5 Safety Advisory 2013-07, on November 20, 2013, to emphasize the importance of proper  
6 characterization, classification, and selection of a packing group for Class 3 materials  
7 (flammable liquids, including petroleum crude oil), and to reinforce the need to follow the  
8 federal hazardous materials regulations for safety and security planning.

9 **ii. Spill Response Capabilities and Equipment Needed for**  
10 **Heavy Crudes**

11 62. Concerns have been raised over the adequacy of spill response  
12 countermeasures to respond to spills of crude oils derived from Alberta oil sands and  
13 “dilbits.” Specifically, the potential for these oils to submerge or sink faster than other  
14 crude oils and the sufficiency of current spill response planning and regulations to  
15 address risks specific to dilbits and other OSPs. However, the current regulatory and  
16 planning system includes robust provisions for the full range of all oil types, including  
17 those that would address risks specific to dilbits and heavier oil derived from Alberta oil  
18 sands.

19 63. Alberta crude oil products delivered to the Terminal may encompass a  
20 range of characteristics. Dilbits are blended oils, have specific gravities less than 1, and  
21 do not sink in fresh or saltwater unless very weathered and/or are combined with  
22 sediment. Immediate response to these spills on water would be similar to conventional  
23 response to most persistent oil spills to water: boom for containment, redirection, and  
24 concentration for skimmer recovery. Experience and tests of oil spill response techniques  
25 with dilbits has shown that the equipment currently maintained by PRCs/OSROs are very

1 suitable for response to a dilbit spill to water. Practical experience with containing dilbit  
2 was gained during response to the Marshall spill (Enbridge, 2013)<sup>18</sup>. Containment on land  
3 encompassed berms and sorbent barriers. On water containment entailed multiple boom  
4 lines. These barriers helped to minimize oil movement and to concentrate oil for  
5 collection.

6 64. CRREL and SLRoss (2015)<sup>19</sup> reported that their meso-scale flume testing  
7 results indicated that the diluted bitumen products may not form as stable emulsions as  
8 some heavy conventional oils. The high viscosities that occur after days of weathering  
9 will require specialized heavy oil skimmers and oil handling systems be used in a spill  
10 response, not dissimilar to those used for weathered bunker spills. These heavy oil  
11 response packages will be effective on both oil types but may be needed somewhat earlier  
12 in the response operation in the case of diluted bitumen spills.

13 65. Tests with dilbits on brackish water showed skimmers effectively  
14 recovered the crude from the water surface for up to 8 days of weathering in open tanks  
15 (WPW, 2013; Taylor et al. 2014)<sup>20</sup>. Skimmer efficiencies generally ranged from near 70%  
16 to over 95% with weathered oil recovery rates ranging from approximately 1 to 3 m<sup>3</sup>/hr.  
17 Skimmer manufacturers at the Gainford trials noted that the equipment, oleophilic brush  
18 systems set up for heavy oil collection, may have benefited from a different approach

19

20

21 <sup>18</sup> Enbridge, 2013. Enbridge Line 6B Response,  
<http://response.enbridgeus.com/response/main.aspx?id=12783> (accessed Sept. 2013)

22 <sup>19</sup> CRREL and SLRoss, 2015. Investigation of the Behavior of Diluted Bitumen and Heavy Conventional  
Crude Oil Spills. Report to the American Petroleum Institute, February 2015, 162pp.

23 <sup>20</sup> Taylor, E., Challenger, G., Rios, J., Morris, J., McCarthy, M.W., and C. Brown. 2014. Dilbit Crude Oil  
Weathering on Brackish Water: Meso-scale Tests of Behavior and Spill Countermeasures. Proceedings of  
the Thirty-Seventh AMOP Technical Seminar. Environment Canada, pp. 317 – 337.

24 Witt O'Briens, Polaris Applied Sciences, and Western Canada Marine Response Corporation. 2013. A  
study of fate and behavior of diluted bitumen oils on marine waters; Dilbit Experiments, Gainford, Alberta.  
25 (WPW 2013)

1 initially, such as using oleophilic disks and even weir skimmers with suitable pumps  
2 during the first days of the trials.

3           66.     An OSP (Albian Heavy syncrude) spill occurred in 2007 from a pipeline  
4 damaged by a backhoe operator, Part of the on-land spill reached Burrard Inlet, Burnaby,  
5 B.C. Approximately 15,000 m of shoreline were affected by the spill. A five-year  
6 environmental impact assessment study after the spill indicated that spill response  
7 operations were effective at removing oil from the environment and in limiting the short-  
8 and long-term effects of the spill<sup>21</sup>. Oil was recovered by skimming and booming, as well  
9 as by flushing and removal from the affected shorelines. Though shoreline intertidal zones  
10 were oiled, most marine sediments had only a small increase in measured polycyclic  
11 aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) concentrations, with 20 of 78 monitored sites exceeding  
12 water quality guidelines. Levels of extractable hydrocarbons and PAHs for surface water  
13 quality requirements were met in 2007. Subtidal marine sediments were monitored  
14 through 2011, with most samples having levels of PAHs below the water quality  
15 requirements. Those subtidal sediment samples that did exceed the maximum regulated  
16 PAH levels appeared to be caused by sources other than the spill. Based on these  
17 observations, only trace amounts or less of oil from the 2007 spill appear to have  
18 remained in the marine harbor sediments.

19           67.     In general, the risk of submerged or sunken oil applies to some degree to  
20 many crude oils and heavier processed oils. All crude oils, like many refined products,  
21 will weather as light ends evaporate. Depending on the originating oil and local  
22 conditions, a few crude oils may weather to a point where portions of the weathered oil  
23

24 <sup>21</sup> Stantec Consulting Ltd., Summary of Clean up and Effects of the 2007 Spill of Oil from the Trans  
25 Mountain Pipeline to Burrard Inlet (2012), <http://www.transmountain.com/uploads/pages/1374960812-2012-Summary-2007-Spill-Clean-Up---Effects-REV2.pdf>

1 submerge or sink. Other weathered oils that would normally remain floating may  
2 submerge or sink if sufficient sediment is mixed with oil.

3 68. As with other heavy oils, options for locating, containing and recovering  
4 non-floating oil would need to be included in oil spill response plans. Generally,  
5 however, standard spill countermeasures used for crudes such as Alaska's North Slope, or  
6 for intermediate fuel oils and bunkers, are also applicable for OSPs, particularly early in  
7 the response. As oil sands crudes weather and interact with sediment, a portion of a spill  
8 can become neutrally to negatively buoyant. That a portion of the crude may submerge or  
9 sink is not limited to OSPs. Case histories have revealed that spills of light crudes and  
10 bunkers have also resulted in a portion of the spill becoming submerged or sinking (API  
11 2016)<sup>22</sup>. Containment of the submerged to sunken portions of the oil included natural  
12 collection points (pools, basins) for sunken oil and geotextile barriers for submerged oil.

13 69. The NW Area Plan recognizes the importance of understanding the  
14 potential behavior of oils handled and has specified best practices for cases in which oil  
15 does not remain floating, as noted in the 2014 NW Area Plan Section 3420.2:

- 16 • Recovering oil in fast-moving water is difficult, as oil tends to flow under  
17 containment booms and skimmer efficiency is greatly reduced, necessitating  
18 more rapid responses further downstream. In these situations, the USCG  
19 recommends installing underflow dams, overflow dams, sorbent barriers, or a  
20 combination of these techniques.
- 21 • Develop detection strategies potentially using sonar, divers/cameras,  
22 ROV/camera, aircraft, photo bathymetry, diaper drops, dragnet, snare drops,  
23 and side-scan sonar.
- 24 • Containment strategies consist of using bubble curtains, water jets, surface-to-  
25 bottom nets/screens, silt curtain, and natural collection sites.
- Recovery strategies consist of using diver directed oil recovery operations,  
remotely operated vehicles, dredges, vacuum systems, integrated video  
mapping systems, nets, sorbents, bioremediation and pre-spill surveys.

22 <sup>22</sup> API 2016. Sunken Oil Detection and Recovery, API Technical Report 1154-1; API 2016, Sunken Oil  
25 Detection and Recovery Operational Guide, API Technical Report 1154-2

- Consider expanding the ICS Structure to include Oil Detection Groups, Sinking Oil Recovery Groups, and Sinking Oil Divisions.

70. These and additional strategies and tactics, along with contractors that can provide diving services, would be considered as resources to be included in a spill plan for cases in which a portion of a spill may potentially submerge or sink. The API Reports provide a field guide and manual for detection, containment and recovery of submerged and sunken oil. The dilbit scenario details captured in the TSPT 2016 spill tabletop exercise documentation provides a list of the contractors and sources of services for the possibility of submerged oil, including Global Diving for sonar, side scan, and diving; Fred Divine for diving and vacuum systems; T&T Marine and Hicky Marine for dredging, Manson Marine for silt curtains, and Gravity Environmental for vessels and sonar<sup>23</sup>.

**iii. Facility**

a. Familiarity with Applicant’s Spill Response Capabilities in the Vicinity of the Facility

71. I reviewed the draft Oil Spill Contingency Plan (OSCP) for Vancouver Energy Terminal and collaborated with the team that developed the tabletop exercise in January 2016. Spill Response Exercise Report, Ex-0001-PCE (Revised Application for Site Certification (“ASC”), Appendix B6). I am familiar with OSR contractors along the Columbia River and the Maritime Fire and Safety Association (MFSA) Umbrella Plan. Chapter 4 of the DEIS fails to adequately recognize planning and regulatory measures in place to respond to significant events (such as spill planning, GRPs, etc.). While the opening sections of Chapter 4 describe these measures, the DEIS then essentially ignores them when describing the level of impact from an incident. This omission is significant. These spill response measures are known to be effective. For example, as confirmed in the

<sup>23</sup> Ex-0001-PCE (Revised Application for Site Certification (“Revised ASC”), Appendix B6).

1 January 2016 Tesoro tabletop assessment of spill response actions and capabilities to  
2 worst-case discharge, the proposed equipment and personnel response times meet and/or  
3 exceed timelines to mobilize equipment to address GRPs in a timely manner given likely  
4 oil trajectories<sup>24</sup>.

5 b. Applicant's Primary Spill Responders

6 72. TSPT has identified Clean Rivers Cooperative (CRC), Global, Marine Spill  
7 Response Corporation (MSRC), in addition to the personnel and spill response resources  
8 that are proposed for staging at the facility, to provide for a cascaded response that meets  
9 and exceeds the high standards set by the State of Washington and the NW Area Plan for  
10 spill response.

11 73. The June 2015 version of the OSCP would be updated for operations to  
12 reflect final OSR equipment on site, formalized contract agreements for primary response  
13 contractors, oiled wildlife care, and incident management team personnel, and to reflect  
14 the 2015 version of re-defined GRPs for the Columbia River. It is important to recognize  
15 that OSCPs are plans that undergo review and updates on a regular basis, as a best practice  
16 and as required by regulation. The January 2016 tabletop exercise illustrated perfectly the  
17 new information available and used for spill response actions, including the 2015 updated  
18 GRPs for the Lower Columbia River, contacts for notification GRPs, and available  
19 equipment. The VE OSCP for operations would include the information from the January  
20 2016 tabletop exercise<sup>25</sup>: GRP priorities listed in Incident Command System (ICS) forms  
21 232 and 232A, operational assignments (ICS 204s and/or 210s), and the detailed spill  
22 response action plans for waste management and disposal, shoreline assessment, wildlife,  
23 sampling, recovered oil and water, and decontamination.

24

<sup>24</sup> Spill Response Exercise Report, Ex-0001-PCE (Revised ASC, Appendix B6)

25 <sup>25</sup> Spill Response Exercise Report, Ex-0001-PCE (Revised ASC, Appendix B6)

1           74. As noted in the Comments letter, the DEIS fails to mention the Western  
2 Resource Response List (WRRL)<sup>26</sup>. The WRRL includes caches from multiple public  
3 agencies and private entities within the rail and vessel corridor and was the foundation for  
4 the resources listed in the tabletop documentation. Ex-0001-PCE (Revised ASC,  
5 Appendix B6). The WDOE website furthermore illustrates to locations of the PRC  
6 equipment listed, showing extensive coverage along the Columbia River (attached hereto  
7 as Attachment H).

8           75. In an analysis of the resources that are available for response to a worst-  
9 case discharge (WCD) from the facility, the two contracted PRCs (CRC and MSCR)  
10 provide the following levels of equipment available at the staging sites for the WCD (Port  
11 of Vancouver-WA, St. Helens-OR, and Longview-WA) upon activation, complementing  
12 the equipment summary provided in the DEIS. Ex-0051-PCE (DEIS, Appendix D.4  
13 attached hereto as Attachment I).

14           76. As noted in the analysis, the sole deficit shown is with respect to temporary  
15 oil storage. The only storage considered in the exercise was mobile storage available from  
16 PRCs as portable tanks, bladders, or a dedicated barge. Additional storage is available  
17 from the on-land storage capacity of tanks at the terminal, storage tanks in Portland,  
18 available rail cars, and additional contracted barge storage capacity.

19           77. The Applicant also has committed to stage additional response equipment  
20 as described in section 5.1.9.2 of the PDEIS, including:

- 21           • In Pasco, 5,000 feet of river boom and associated anchor systems, and one  
22 Current Buster number 2 on reel in a conex with blower and hydraulic power  
23 unit (HPU) system installed.
- 24           • In Vancouver, 5,000 feet of river boom and associated anchor systems, and one  
25 Current Buster number 2 on reel in a conex with blower and HPU system  
installed (Haugstad 2013).

26 <sup>26</sup> WDOE Comments re DEIS, 2015

1           78.     The PRC resources would be used to implement GRP strategies applicable  
2 within the 48 hour planning window<sup>27</sup>. The list includes those sites listed in the NWACP  
3 GRP October 2015 listing for the Lower Columbia River and is augmented with  
4 additional sensitive sites known to the response organization. Culturally sensitive areas  
5 that may require protection would be in addition to those listed but are not included in  
6 public documents.

7           79.     As explained in more detail in revisions to the OSCP, Ex-0001-PCE  
8 (Revised ASC, Appendix B4) and the Spill Response Exercise Report, Ex-0001-PCE  
9 (Revised ASC, Appendix B6), during a tabletop exercise to determine the adequacy of  
10 response action resources, TSPT and contractors were able to locate, allocate, and deploy  
11 more than adequate response equipment and trained personnel in accordance with  
12 application spill planning standards. The results of this exercise to test the adequacy of  
13 proper execution of the response actions (along with pre-booming and secondary  
14 booming) show that a spill response would be rapid and with extensive resources to  
15 contain and recover spilled oil and to protect sensitive aquatic resources.

16                   **iv.     Vessel**

17                           a.     Familiarity with Applicant's Spill Response Capabilities in  
18   the Marine Vessel Corridor

19           80.     Tank vessels are envisioned to transport crude oil from the Terminal to  
20 markets in the US and abroad. Tank vessels operating on the Lower Columbia River fall  
21 under federal (USCG) and state (Washington and Oregon) regulations for spill  
22 preparedness and response. The Testimony of Dennis O'Mara describes the navigation  
23 risks for vessel on the Columbia River and provides a quantitative risk analysis for  
24 potential vessel-source spills. As with any tank vessel presently operating on the lower

25                   <sup>27</sup> App B4c - OSCP revisions Jan 2016 DEIS letter, pg. 22-40.

1 Columbia River, tank vessels that would call upon the Terminal must have an approved  
2 oil spill contingency plan and pre-contracted arrangements for spill response.

3 b. Applicant's Primary Spill Responders

4 81. Section 4.5.2.1 of the DEIS states that “[t]he response to a crude oil spill in  
5 the vessel corridor would primarily be the responsibility of the USCG, Ecology, ODEQ,  
6 and CRC. The vessel owner would also respond through activation of the VRP. The RP(s)  
7 would be obligated to fund the response and pay for damages.” This statement  
8 mischaracterizes responsibility for response to a crude oil spill. The vessel operator and  
9 the product owner are primarily responsible for response to a spill from their vessel and of  
10 their product, respectively<sup>28</sup>. The Responsible Party (RP) initiates response by making  
11 notifications to its PRC (or direct to MFSA, if covered under that plan). The MFSA  
12 Incident Commander is the initial representative of the Responsible Party for immediate  
13 spill response if the vessel is covered under that umbrella plan<sup>29</sup>. Alternatively, a  
14 representative for the RP is assigned as the Incident Commander. The Incident  
15 Commander works in Unified Command with federal and state On-Scene Coordinators to  
16 direct the response. All tank vessels are required to have approved VRPs that identify the  
17 contracted capability to provide response to average, maximum, and worst-case spills  
18 within stipulated timeframes. Umbrella plans, such as that provided through the MFSA,  
19 provide the immediate response capability to meet the response times and capabilities for  
20 covered vessels. If the RP is unable or unwilling to undertake the response, command may  
21 be assumed by the USCG or the State.

22 82. The Applicant's role in providing primary spill response assets for a vessel-  
23 based spill may unfold in one of several ways:

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
<sup>28</sup> MFSA Letter to WA EFSEC at 8 (Jan. 22, 2016)

25 <sup>29</sup> *Id.* at 6.

- 1 • At the terminal (during loading) – to the extent safe and effective, all transfer  
2 operations would be pre-boomed. If safe and effective pre-booming thresholds  
3 are exceeded (DEIS, Apps. D.3 and K), OSR resources would be on standby  
4 for immediate deployment if the need were to arise. Thresholds above which  
5 pre-booming would not be performed are:
  - 6 ○ Water current speed > 1.5 knots will be the effective threshold value
  - 7 ○ Wave heights > 2 to 2.5 feet will be the safe and effective threshold value
  - 8 ○ Sustained wind speed greater than 30 knots (~35 mph)
  - 9 ○ Low visibility resulting from fog, heavy precipitation, or snow at the dock  
10 and/or boom deployment vessel
- 11 • If pre-booming thresholds are exceeded but conditions allow for safe  
12 operations (DEIS, Apps. D.3 and L), boom and skiffs would be placed on  
13 standby for immediate deployment in case of a spill.
- 14 • The terminal must have the capability to initiate the deployment of four times  
15 the largest vessel (4 x 900 = 3600 feet) or 2,000 feet of boom, whichever is  
16 less, within 3 hours. The Terminal has 3,000 feet and skiffs to immediate boom  
17 deployment. DEIS, App. D.4; id. § 7.1.8.
- 18 • While underway or at anchor – a spill originating from the vessel underway or  
19 at anchor would trigger the vessel response plan, which in most cases is the  
20 MFSA OSRP for the initial 24 hrs. TSPT OSR assets may be mobilized, upon  
21 request, to augment a tiered response capability for the vessel response.

22 83. The DEIS observes that the current MFSA spill contingency plan is not  
23 designed to address spills greater than 300,000 bbl and is primarily focused on addressing  
24 spills of refined petroleum products<sup>30</sup>. The typical capacity of the handymax class vessels,  
25 which would be expected to usually transport the crude oil from Vancouver Energy, is not  
much more than 300,000 bbl (at 319,925 bbl). Moreover, when the facility is approved,  
MFSA will amend its Contingency Plan and add any additional equipment necessary to  
meet the additional commodity types and quantities. Facility vessels would not be loaded  
in an amount that exceeds the MFSA spill contingency plan volumes. *See* WAC 173-182,  
Section C.

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<sup>30</sup> DEIS, App. D.15.

1           84.     The MFSA Plan and response system includes recovery equipment that can  
2 handle light ends as well as heavier products that float<sup>31</sup>. MFSA's Primary Response  
3 Contractor (Clean Rivers Cooperative, CRC) has also exercised responses to products that  
4 may sink, such as asphalt. The Plan's associated response equipment capacities currently  
5 exceed Washington and Oregon Department of Environmental Quality planning  
6 standards.

7                   **v.     Rail**

8                           a.     Applicant's Primary Spill Responders

9           85.     As with vessels, the primary responder for a rail spill is the railroad  
10 operator as the RP, working in collaboration with federal and state designated On-Scene  
11 Coordinators through a Unified Command structure. In the unlikely event of a rail spill,  
12 the railway operator's oil spill contingency plan would be triggered, mobilizing the  
13 contracted spill response capability of its PRCs. For example, Burlington Northern Santa  
14 Fe (BNSF) maintains caches of spill response equipment at five locations along the  
15 Columbia River. These caches contain boom, skimmers, portable tanks for temporary  
16 storage, and ancillary equipment, tools, and resources. Caches are maintained in trailers  
17 for towed transport over land, one on a flatbed rail car, and another packaged to be  
18 transported by helicopter.

19           86.     In addition to its own oil spill response caches, BNSF rail has contracts  
20 with the same two PRCs as the Terminal: MSRC and CRC along the Columbia River, as  
21 well as Clean Harbors, Global Diving & Salvage, and National Response Corp.  
22 Environmental Services.

23                           b.     Spill Response Capabilities and Plan Efficacy

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25                   

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<sup>31</sup> MFSA Letter 22 January 2016, pg 2.

1           87.     The Applicant’s role in providing primary spill response assets for a rail-  
2 based spill may unfold in one of several ways:

- 3           •     A spill within the Terminal would have limited movement given  
4 design of site drainage, impermeable catchments, and secondary  
5 containment.
- 6           •     Terminal personnel and equipment provide a first response  
7 capability to augment the rail response.
- 8           •     TSPT OSR assets may be mobilized, upon request, to augment a  
9 tiered response capability for a rail response at other locations.

10           88.     A rail transport spill is unlikely given the precautions adopted for crude oil  
11 transport. Nonetheless, there is public debate over the realistic maximum scenario for spill  
12 planning purposes should a spill occur,<sup>32</sup>.

13           89.     In its report, the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission  
14 (WUTC)<sup>33</sup> found a reasonable worst-case spill for planning purposes may encompass 1 to  
15 3.5 million gallons (approximately 24,000 to 83,000 bbl), which is substantially less than  
16 the worst-case discharges defined for the terminal or a vessel. Draft regulations for oil  
17 transport by rail, however, identify the WCD as the full volume of oil transported in rail  
18 cars plus fuel and other oils of the train. Chapter 173-186 WAC, “Oil Spill Contingency  
19 Plan – Railroad Rulemaking.” The latter WCD is unrealistic.

20                   **vi.     The Oil Spill Response Capacity along the Columbia River**  
21                   **Greatly Exceed Requirements**

22           90.     Based on my expertise and understanding of the proposed operations, the  
23 prevention measures proposed, and the emergency planning already developed for the  
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25           <sup>32</sup> See WUTC, Rail Safety Rulemaking Related to ESHB 1449, Docket TR-151079, Oil Train Safety  
Rulemaking (Jan. 2015); Samantha Wohlfeil, Railroads Required to Plan for a Worst-Case Oil train Spill in  
Washington State, Emergency Management (May 18, 2015),  
[http://www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/Railroads-Required-Plan-Worst-Case-Oil-Train-Spill-  
Washington.html](http://www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/Railroads-Required-Plan-Worst-Case-Oil-Train-Spill-Washington.html). By way of example,

<sup>33</sup> WUTC, Rail Safety Rulemaking Related to ESHB 1449, Docket TR-151079, Oil Train Safety  
Rulemaking (Jan. 2015).

1 DEIS review, the Project has identified the measures and means that protect the  
2 environment and that can adequately clean up an oil spill in the Columbia River in the  
3 unlikely event that it should happen. Compliance with the stringent planning requirements  
4 defined and enforced by WDOE, in addition to Oregon and federal requirements ensures  
5 that the most protective measures adopted in the US are met.

6 91. In my opinion, the professional response resources under contract to the  
7 facility, rail operators, and tank vessels are strategically located and appropriate to  
8 respond to and minimize the adverse effects of spills for these potential sources. PRCs and  
9 the Project have identified areas for additional resources to be identified.

10 92. Present response capabilities along the Columbia River are in place to  
11 address spills of oils ranging from Group 1 light-end volatile products, such as gasoline, to  
12 Group 4 and 5 heavy-end products, such as asphalt. The crude oil products proposed for  
13 transport and handling for this Project, Bakken crude and OSPs, have fresh and weathered  
14 oil characteristics that are encompassed by oil Groups 1 through 5. Spill response plans  
15 are in place locally and regionally to address the range of oil types that are being  
16 transported in the region and the Project has identified additional initiatives to augment  
17 awareness and emergency response planning. Ex-0001-PCE (Revised ASC, Section  
18 1.4.1).

19 93. The project has identified through its worst-case spill tabletop that it has  
20 the capability to deliver, within 6 hours, 158,616 barrels per day of skimming capacity,  
21 51,364 bbls of temporary storage, and 135,842 feet of boom through its professional spill  
22 response contractors<sup>34</sup>. The resources available in the relatively short timeframe greatly  
23 surpasses planning standards and provide the means to contain and intercept oil, collect  
24 and remove oil, protect sensitive areas, and mitigate the possible adverse effects from the

25 <sup>34</sup> Spill Response Exercise Report, Ex-0001-PCE (Revised ASC, Appendix B6)

1 unlikely case of a major spill. Furthermore, specialized services are identified and in place  
2 for the possibility that a portion of an oil spill may submerge or sink.

3 **IV. EXHIBITS**

4 94. The following documents are attached to my testimony for reference:

5 Attachment A: Elliott Taylor CV

6 Attachment B: Summary of Inspections

7 Attachment C: EPA and USCG Defined Petroleum-Based Oil Groups

8 Attachment D: Ranges of Physical Properties for Example Oil Types

9 Attachment E: Tank and Flume Experimental Results for Changes in

10 Weathered Oil Density

11 Attachment F: ADIOS Modeling Results for Bakken and Dilbit Scenarios

12 Attachment G: Summary of Fate and Behavior and Potential Adverse

13 Effects on Environment for Major Oil Types

14 Attachment H: WDOE Map of PRC Equipment

15 Attachment I: Ex-0051-PCE (DEIS, Appendix D.4, Section 7.1.8

16 Excerpts)

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